"There is a multilayering of global networks in the key strategic activities that structure and destructure the planet. When these multilayered networks overlap in some node, when there is a node that belongs to different networks, two major consequences follow. First, economies of synergy between these different networks take place in that node: between financial markets and media businesses; or between academic research and technology development and innovation; between politics and media." (Manuel Castells, "The Rise of the Network Society", 1996)
"A key conclusion stemming from our most recent crises is that economies cannot enjoy the advantages of a sophisticated international financial system without the internal discipline that enables such economies to adjust without crisis to changing circumstances." (Alan Greenspan, "The Structure of the International Financial System", 1998)
"Financial markets are supposed to swing like a pendulum: They may fluctuate wildly in response to exogenous shocks, but eventually they are supposed to come to rest at an equilibrium point and that point is supposed to be the same irrespective of the interim fluctuations." (George Soros, "The Crisis of Global Capitalism", 1998)
"It has become evident time and again that when events become too complex and move too rapidly as appears to be the case today, human beings become demonstrably less able to cope." (Alan Greenspan, "The Structure of the International Financial System", 1998)
"If financial markets aren't efficient, then what are they? According to the 'fractal market hypothesis', they are highly unstable dynamic systems that generate stock prices which appear random, but behind which lie deterministic patterns." (Steve Keen, "Debunking Economics: The Naked Emperor Of The Social Sciences", 2001)
"The long term solution to the financial crisis is to move beyond the ‘growth at all costs’ economic model to a model that recognizes the real costs and benefits of growth." (Robert Costanza, "Toward a New Sustainable Economy", 2008)
"There is common ground in analysing financial systems and ecosystems, especially in the need to identify conditions that dispose a system to be knocked from seeming stability into another, less happy state." (Robert M May et al, "Complex systems: Ecology for bankers" 2008)
"In a complex society, individuals, organizations, and states require a high degree of confidence - even if it is misplaced - in the short-term future and a reasonable degree of confidence about the longer term. In its absence they could not commit themselves to decisions, investments, and policies. Like nudging the frame of a pinball machine to influence the path of the ball, we cope with the dilemma of uncertainty by doing what we can to make our expectations of the future self-fulfilling. We seek to control the social and physical worlds not only to make them more predictable but to reduce the likelihood of disruptive and damaging shocks (e.g., floods, epidemics, stock market crashes, foreign attacks). Our fallback strategy is denial." (Richard N Lebow, "Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations", 2010)
"[...] central banking has been transformed, in practice and in theory [...] The list of assumptions that turned out to be false is lengthy: that the financial system would be self-stabilising, that managers of banks would prove competent, that financial innovation would improve risk management, that low and stable inflation would guarantee economic stability. We have witnessed a bonfire of the verities [...]" (Martin Wolf, The Financial Times, 2012)
"Economists should study financial markets as they actually operate, not as they assume them to operate - observing the way in which information is actually processed, observing the serial correlations, bonanzas, and sudden stops, not assuming these away as noise around the edges of efficient and rational markets." (Adair Turner, "Economics after the Crisis: Objectives and means", 2012)
"Policymakers are now beginning to develop quantitative models of systemic risk that explicitly measure losses to the financial system that result from low probability scenarios. These models trace shocks through bank balance sheets and allow for macrocredit risk, network interactions between institutions, and feedback effects arising on both the asset and liability side of the balance sheet." (Prasanna Gai, "Systemic Risk: The Dynamics of Modern Financial Systems", 2013)
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