🏷️Knowledge Representation: On Cognitive Maps (Quotes)

"[...] we believe that in the course of learning something like a field map of the environment gets established in the rat's brain [...] and it is this tentative map, indicating routes and paths and environmental relationships, which finally determines what responses, if any, the animal will finally release." (Edward C Tolman, "Cognitive maps in rats and men", Psychological Review 55(4), 1948)

"[…] learning consists not in stimulus-response connections but in the building up in the nervous system of sets which function like cognitive maps […] such cognitive maps may be usefully characterized as varying from a narrow strip variety to a broader comprehensive variety." (Edward C Tolman, "Cognitive maps in rats and men", Psychological Review 55(4), 1948)

"The cognitive map is a construct that has been proposed to explain how individuals know their environment. It assumes that people store information about their environment in a simplified form and in relation to other information they already have. It further assumes that this information is coded in a structure which people carry around in their heads, and that this structure corresponds, at least to a reasonable degree, to the environment it represents. It is as if an individual carried a map or model of the environment in his head." (Stephen Kaplan, "Cognitive maps, human needs and the designed environment", Environmental design research vol. 1, 1973)

"A person is changed by the contingencies of reinforcement under which he behaves; he does not store the contingencies. In particular, he does not store copies of the stimuli which have played a part in the contingencies. There are no 'iconic representations' in his mind; there are no 'data structures stored in his memory'; he has no 'cognitive map' of the world in which he has lived. He has simply been changed in such a way that stimuli now control particular kinds of perceptual behavior." (Burrhus F Skinner, "About behaviorism", 1974)

"A cognitive map is a specific way of representing a person's assertions about some limited domain, such as a policy problem. It is designed to capture the structure of the person's causal assertions and to generate the consequences that follow front this structure. […]  a person might use his cognitive map to derive explanations of the past, make predictions for the future, and choose policies in the present." (Robert M Axelrod, "Structure of Decision: The cognitive maps of political elites", 1976)

"The cognitive mapping approach promises to be more helpful to the decision maker for two reasons. First, since the advice can be expressed in terms of the person's own cognitive map, it can be solidly based in his own experience, using his own concepts, his own causal beliefs. and his own values. Equally important, when the cognitive map approach offers advice, it takes explicit account of the finite capacities of people and the way in which they simplify their images when dealing with a complex policy issue. Thus, with the cognitive mapping approach, a better understanding of how decisions are made can lead to the making of better decisions." (Robert M Axelrod, "Structure of Decision: The cognitive maps of political elites", 1976)

"Briefly, a cognitive map would consist of two major systems, a place system and a misplace system. The first is a memory system which contains information about places in the organism's environment, their spatial relations, and the existence of specific objects in specific places. The second, misplace, system signals changes in a particular place, involving either the presence of a new object or the absence of an old one. The place system permits an animal to locate itself in a familiar environment without reference to any specific sensory input, to go from one place to another independent of particular inputs (cues) or outputs (responses), and to link together conceptually parts of an environment which have never been experienced at the same time. The misplace system is primarily responsible for exploration, a species-typical behaviour which functions to build maps of new environments and to incorporate new information into existing maps." (John O'Keefe & Lynn Nadel, "The Hippocampus as a Cognitive Map", 1978)

"The cognitive map is not a picture or image which 'looks like' what it represents; rather, it is an information structure from which map-like images can be reconstructed and from which behaviour dependent upon place information can be generated." (John O'Keefe & Lynn Nadel, "The Hippocampus as a Cognitive Map", 1978)

"We would agree that organisms do not 'see' absolute space; cognitive maps are not pictures of the universe, they are schemata from which any portion of space can be constructed. The fact that we cannot perceive unified space does not mean we cannot conceive it; the latter potentiality derives from the possession of a structure which can be used to construct spaces that stretch endlessly in all dimensions." (John O'Keefe & Lynn Nadel, "The Hippocampus as a Cognitive Map", 1978)

"[...] cognitive maps can be seen as a picture or visual aid in comprehending the mappers' understanding of particular, and selective, elements of the thoughts (rather than thinking) of an individual, group or organization. They may also be seen as a representation that is amenable to analysis by both the mapper and others." (Colin Eden, "One the nature of cognitive maps", Journal of Management Studies 29 (3), 1992)

"Bounded rationality simultaneously constrains the complexity of our cognitive maps and our ability to use them to anticipate the system dynamics. Mental models in which the world is seen as a sequence of events and in which feedback, nonlinearity, time delays, and multiple consequences are lacking lead to poor performance when these elements of dynamic complexity are present. Dysfunction in complex systems can arise from the misperception of the feedback structure of the environment. But rich mental models that capture these sources of complexity cannot be used reliably to understand the dynamics. Dysfunction in complex systems can arise from faulty mental simulation - the misperception of feedback dynamics. These two different bounds on rationality must both be overcome for effective learning to occur. Perfect mental models without a simulation capability yield little insight; a calculus for reliable inferences about dynamics yields systematically erroneous results when applied to simplistic models." (John D Sterman, "Business Dynamics: Systems thinking and modeling for a complex world", 2000)

"Even if our cognitive maps of causal structure were perfect, learning, especially double-loop learning, would still be difficult. To use a mental model to design a new strategy or organization we must make inferences about the consequences of decision rules that have never been tried and for which we have no data. To do so requires intuitive solution of high-order nonlinear differential equations, a task far exceeding human cognitive capabilities in all but the simplest systems."  (John D Sterman, "Business Dynamics: Systems thinking and modeling for a complex world", 2000)

"The robustness of the misperceptions of feedback and the poor performance they cause are due to two basic and related deficiencies in our mental model. First, our cognitive maps of the causal structure of systems are vastly simplified compared to the complexity of the systems themselves. Second, we are unable to infer correctly the dynamics of all but the simplest causal maps. Both are direct consequences of bounded rationality, that is, the many limitations of attention, memory, recall, information processing capability, and time that constrain human decision making." (John D Sterman, "Business Dynamics: Systems thinking and modeling for a complex world", 2000)

"Eliciting and mapping the participant's mental models, while necessary, is far from sufficient [...] the result of the elicitation and mapping process is never more than a set of causal attributions, initial hypotheses about the structure of a system, which must then be tested. Simulation is the only practical way to test these models. The complexity of the cognitive maps produced in an elicitation workshop vastly exceeds our capacity to understand their implications. Qualitative maps are simply too ambiguous and too difficult to simulate mentally to provide much useful information on the adequacy of the model structure or guidance about the future development of the system or the effects of policies." (John D Sterman, "Learning in and about complex systems", Systems Thinking Vol. 3 2003)

[cognitive map:] "A mental representation of a portion of the physical environment and the relative locations of points within it." (Andrew M Colman, "A Dictionary of Psychology" 3rd Ed, 2008)

[cognitive map:] "A mental model (or map) of the external environment which may be constructed following exploratory behaviour." (Michael Allaby, "A Dictionary of Zoology" 3rd Ed., 2009)

"There is no reason to believe that cognitive maps are like iconic maps except, rather than being inscribed in the dirt, or on a rock, or imprinted on paper, they are somehow inscribed in neural tissue. They seem to be more like lists of significant places intertwined with bearings and headings between one place and another. The vital significance of these places is part and parcel of the map; the “map” is not a neutral spatial substrate to which vital significance is later attached. The space of cognitive maps is not merely about physical position; it is about needs and satisfiers, vantage points and opportunities for action." (William Benzon, "Maps, Iconic and Abstract", 2011)

[Cognitive Map:] "A representation of the conceptualization that the subject constructs of the system in which he evolves. The set of cognitive representations that emerge make it possible to understand his actions, the links between the factors structuring the cognitive patterns dictating his behaviors." (Henda E Karray & Souhaila Kammoun, "Strategic Orientation of the Managers of a Tunisian Family Group Before and After the Revolution", 2020)

🏷️Knowledge Representation: On Schema/Schemata (Quotes)

"That faculty which perceives and recognizes the noble proportions in what is given to the senses, and in other things situated outside itself, must be ascribed to the soul. It lies very close to the faculty which supplies formal schemata to the senses, or deeper still, and thus adjacent to the purely vital power of the soul, which does not think discursively […] Now it might be asked how this faculty of the soul, which does not engage in conceptual thinking, and can therefore have no proper knowledge of harmonic relations, should be capable of recognizing what is given in the outside world. For to recognize is to compare the sense perception outside with the original pictures inside, and to judge that it conforms to them." (Johannes Kepler, "Harmonices Mundi" ["Harmony of the World"] , 1619)

"This formal and pure condition of sensibility to which the employment of the concept of understanding is restricted, we shall entitle the schema of the concept. The procedure of understanding in these schemata we shall entitle the schematism of pure understanding.
 The schema is in itself always a product of imagination. Since, however, the synthesis of imagination aims at no special intuition, but only at unity in the determination of sensibility, the schema has to be distinguished from the image." (Immanuel Kant," Critique of Pure Reason", 1781)

“This schematism of our understanding, in its application to appearances and their mere form, is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze.” (Immanuel Kant, “Critique of Pure Reason”, 1781)

"Thus then does the Doctrine of Knowledge, which in its substance is the realisation of the absolute Power of intelligising which has now been defined, end with the recognition of itself as a mere Schema in a Doctrine of Wisdom, although indeed a necessary and indispensable means to such a Doctrine: - a Schema, the sole aim of which is, with the knowledge thus acquired, - by which knowledge alone a Will, clear and intelligible to itself and reposing upon itself without wavering or perplexity, is possible, - to return wholly into Actual Life; - not into the Life of blind and irrational Instinct which we have laid bare in all its nothingness, but into the Divine Life which shall become visible to us." (Johann G Fichte, "Outline of the Doctrine of Knowledge", 1810)

"Everything which distinguishes man from the animals depends upon this ability to volatilize perceptual metaphors in a schema, and thus to dissolve an image into a concept. For something is possible in the realm of these schemata which could never be achieved with the vivid first impressions: the construction of a pyramidal order according to castes and degrees, the creation of a new world of laws, privileges, subordinations, and clearly marked boundaries - a new world, one which now confronts that other vivid world of first impressions as more solid, more universal, better known, and more human than the immediately perceived world, and thus as the regulative and imperative world." (Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense", 1873)

"That immense framework and planking of concepts to which the needy man clings his whole life long in order to preserve himself is nothing but a scaffolding and toy for the most audacious feats of the liberated intellect. And when it smashes this framework to pieces, throws it into confusion, and puts it back together in an ironic fashion, pairing the most alien things and separating the closest, it is demonstrating that it has no need of these makeshifts of indigence and that it will now be guided by intuitions rather than by concepts. There is no regular path which leads from these intuitions into the land of ghostly schemata, the land of abstractions. There exists no word for these intuitions; when man sees them he grows dumb, or else he speaks only in forbidden metaphors and in unheard - of combinations of concepts. He does this so that by shattering and mocking the old conceptual barriers he may at least correspond creatively to the impression of the powerful present intuition." (Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense", 1873)

"Every definite image in the mind is steeped and dyed in the free water that flows around it. With it goes the sense of its relations, near and remote, the dying echo of whence it came to us, the dawning sense of whither it is to lead. The significance, the value, of the image is all in this halo or penumbra that surrounds and escorts it, - or rather that is fused into one with it and has become bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh; leaving it, it is true, an image of the same thing it was before, but making it an image of that thing newly taken and freshly understood. […] Great thinkers have vast premonitory glimpses of schemes of relations between terms, which hardly even as verbal images enter the mind, so rapid is the whole process. We all of us have this permanent consciousness of whither our thought is going." (William James, "The Principles of Psychology”, 1890)

"This is the greatest degree of impoverishment; the image, deprived little by little of its own characteristics, is nothing more than a shadow. It has become that transitional form between image and pure concept that we now term ‘generic image’, or one that at least resembles the latter. The image, then, is subject to an unending process of change, of suppression and addition, of dissociation and corrosion. 
This means that it is not a dead thing; it is not at all like a photographic plate with which one may reproduce copies indefinitely. Being dependent on the state of the brain, the image undergoes change like all living substance, - it is subject to gains and losses, especially losses. But each of the foregoing three classes has its use for the inventor. They serve as material for different kinds of imagination - in their concrete form, for the mechanic and the artist; in their schematic form, for the scientist and for others." (Théodule-Armand Ribot, "Essay on the Creative Imagination", 1900)

"But surely it is self-evident that every theory is merely a framework or scheme of concepts together with their necessary relations to one another, and that the basic elements can be constructed as one pleases." (Gottlob Frege, [in "On the Foundations of Geometry and Formal Theories of Arithmetic" 1971] cca. 1903-1909)

"If the fresh facts which come to our knowledge all fit themselves into the scheme, then our hypothesis may gradually become a solution." (Arthur C Doyle, "The Adventure of Wisteria Lodge", 1908)

“A geometrical-physical theory as such is incapable of being directly pictured, being merely a system of concepts. But these concepts serve the purpose of bringing a multiplicity of real or imaginary sensory experiences into connection in the mind. To ‘visualise’ a theory, or bring it home to one's mind, therefore means to give a representation to that abundance of experiences for which the theory supplies the schematic arrangement” (Albert Einstein, “Geometry and Experience”, 1921)

"This is the reason why mechanical explanations are better understood than stories, even though they are more difficult to reproduce. The exposition, even if it is faulty, excites analogous schemas already existing in the listener’s mind; so that what takes place is not genuine understanding, but a convergence of acquired schemas of thought. In the case of stories, this convergence is not possible, and the schemas brought into play are usually divergent." (Jean Piaget, "The Language and Thought of the Child", 1926)

"At first sight the assimilative tendency shown by thought seems sufficient to secure stability in judgments. To assimilate, in psychology as in biology, is to reproduce oneself by means of the external world; it is to transform perceptions until they are identical with one’s own thought, i.e. with previous schemas. Assimilation is therefore preservation and, in a certain sense, identification." (Jean Piaget, "Judgement and Reasoning in the Child", 1928)

"In the presence of certain objects of thought or of certain affirmations the child, in virtue of previous experiences, adopts a certain way of reacting and thinking which is always the same, and which might be called a schema of reasoning. Such schemas are the functional equivalents of general propositions, but since the child is not conscious of these schemas before discussion and a desire for proof have laid them bare and at the same time changed their character, they cannot be said to constitute implicit general propositions. They simply constitute certain unconscious tendencies which live their own life but are submitted to no general systematization and consequently lead to no logical exactitude. To put it in another way, they form a logic of action but not yet a logic of thought." (Jean Piaget, "Judgement and Reasoning in the Child", 1928)

"It is not surprising that our language should be incapable of describing the processes occurring within the atoms, for, as has been remarked, it was invented to describe the experiences of daily life, and these consist only of processes involving exceedingly large numbers of atoms. Furthermore, it is very difficult to modify our language so that it will be able to describe these atomic processes, for words can only describe things of which we can form mental pictures, and this ability, too, is a result of daily experience. Fortunately, mathematics is not subject to this limitation, and it has been possible to invent a mathematical scheme - the quantum theory - which seems entirely adequate for the treatment of atomic processes; for visualisation, however, we must content ourselves with two incomplete analogies - the wave picture and the corpuscular picture" (Werner K Heisenberg, "The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory", 1930)

"The methods of progress in theoretical physics have undergone a vast change during the present century. The classical tradition has been to consider the world to be an association of observable objects (particles, fluids, fields, etc.) moving about according to definite laws of force, so that one could form a mental picture in space and time of the whole scheme. This led to a physics whose aim was to make assumptions about the mechanism and forces connecting these observable objects, to account for their behaviour in the simplest possible way. It has become increasingly evident in recent times, however, that nature works on a different plan. Her fundamental laws do not govern the world as it appears in our mental picture in any very direct way, but instead they control a substratum of which we cannot form a mental picture without introducing irrelevancies. (Paul A M Dirac, "The Principles of Quantum Mechanics", 1930)

"Generally speaking, one can say that motor intelligence contains the germs of completed reason. But it gives promise of more than reason pure and simple. From the moral as from the intellectual point of view, the child is born neither good nor bad, but master of his destiny. Now, if there is intelligence in the schemas of motor adaptation, there is also the element of play. The intentionality peculiar to motor activity is not a search for truth but the pursuit of a result, whether objective or subjective; and to succeed is not to discover a truth." (Jean Piaget, "The Moral Judgment of the Child", 1932)

"In this way things, external objects, are assimilated to more or less ordered motor schemas, and in this continuous assimilation of objects the child's own activity is the starting point of play. Not only this, but when to pure movement are added language and imagination, the assimilation is strengthened, and wherever the mind feels no actual need for accommodating itself to reality, its natural tendency will be to distort the objects that surround it in accordance with its desires or its fantasy, in short to use them for its satisfaction. Such is the intellectual egocentrism that characterizes the earliest form of child thought." (Jean Piaget, "The Moral Judgment of the Child", 1932)

"'Schema' refers to an active organisation of past reactions, or of past experiences, which must always be supposed to be operating in any well-adapted organic response. That is, whenever there is any order or regularity of behavior, a particular response is possible only because it is related to other similar responses which have been serially organised, yet which operate, not simply as individual members coming one after another, but as a unitary mass. Determination by schemata is the most fundamental of all the ways in which we can be influenced by reactions and experiences which occurred some time in the past. All incoming impulses of a certain kind, or mode, go together to build up an active, organised setting: visual, auditory, various types of cutaneous impulses and the like, at a relatively low level; all the experiences connected by a common interest: in sport, in literature, history, art, science, philosophy, and so on, on a higher level." (Frederic C Bartlett, "Remembering: A study in experimental and social psychology", 1932)

"[T]he sudden inventions characteristic of the sixth stage [of infant development] are in reality the product of a long evolution of schemata and not only of an internal maturation of perceptive structures. [..] This is revealed by the existence of a fifth stage, characterized by experimental groping. […] What does this mean if not that the practice of actual experience is necessary in order to acquire the practice of mental experience and that invention does not arise entirely preformed despite appearances? (Jean Piaget, "The origin of intelligence in children" 1936)

"The more the schemata are differentiated, the smaller the gap between the new and the familiar becomes, so that novelty, instead of constituting an annoyance avoided by the subject, becomes a problem and invites searching." (Jean Piaget, "The Construction Of Reality In The Child", 1950)

"Accommodation of mental structures to reality implies the existence of assimilatory schemata apart from which any structure would be impossible." (Jean Piaget, "The Construction Of Reality In The Child", 1950)

"What in fact is the schema of the object? In one essential respect it is a schema belonging to intelligence. To have the concept of an object is to attribute the perceived figure to a substantial basis, so that the figure and the substance that it thus indicates continue to exist outside the perceptual field. The permanence of the object seen from this viewpoint is not only a product of intelligence, but constitutes the very first of those fundamental ideas of conservation which we shall see developing within the thought process." (Jean Piaget, "The Psychology of Intelligence", 1950)

"A conceptual scheme is never discarded merely because of a few stubborn facts with which it cannot be reconciled; a conceptual scheme is either modified or replaced by a better one, never abandoned with nothing left to take its place."(James B Conant, "Science and Common Sense", 1951)

"Common sense […] may be thought of as a series of concepts and conceptual schemes which have proved highly satisfactory for the practical uses of mankind. Some of those concepts and conceptual schemes were carried over into science with only a little pruning and whittling and for a long time proved useful. As the recent revolutions in physics indicate, however, many errors can be made by failure to examine carefully just how common sense ideas should be defined in terms of what the experimenter plans to do." (James B Conant, "Science and Common Sense", 1951)

"As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the light of past experience. Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries - not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer." (Willard v O Quine, "From a Logical Point of View", 1953)

"As perceivers we select from all the stimuli falling on our senses only those which interest us, and our interests are governed by a pattern-making tendency, sometimes called a schema. In a chaos of shifting impressions each of us constructs a stable world in which objects have recognisable shapes, are located in depth and have permanence." (Mary Douglas, "Purity and Danger", 1966)

"We realize, however, that all scientific laws merely represent abstractions and idealizations expressing certain aspects of reality. Every science means a schematized picture of reality, in the sense that a certain conceptual construct is unequivocally related to certain features of order in reality […]" (Ludwig von Bertalanffy, "General System Theory", 1968)

"Imagining is not perceiving, but images are indeed derivatives of perceptual activity. In particular, they are the anticipatory phases of that activity, schemata that the perceiver has detached from the perceptual cycle for other purposes. […] The experience of having an image is just the inner aspect of a readiness to perceive the imagined object. (Ulrich Neisser, "Cognition and reality" 1976)

"A schema is a configuration within the brain, either inborn or learned, against which the input of the nerve cells is compared. [...] the conscious mind [...] can fill in details that are missing from the actual sensory input and create a pattern in the mind which is not necessarily present in reality. In this way, the gestalt of objects - the impression [...] - is aided by the taxonomic powers of the schemata." (Edward O Wilson, "On Human Nature", 1978) 

"A schema, then is a data structure for representing the generic concepts stored in memory. There are schemata representing our knowledge about all concepts; those underlying objects, situations, events, sequences of events, actions and sequences of actions. A schema contains, as part of its specification, the network of interrelations that is believed to normally hold among the constituents of the concept in question. A schema theory embodies a prototype theory of meaning. That is, inasmuch as a schema underlying a concept stored in memory corresponds to the meaning of that concept, meanings are encoded in terms of the typical or normal situations or events that instantiate that concept." (David E Rumelhart, "Schemata: The building blocks of cognition", 1980)

"Once we have accepted a configuration of schemata, the schemata themselves provide a richness that goes far beyond our observations. […] In fact, once we have determined that a particular schema accounts for some event, we may not be able to determine which aspects of our beliefs are based on direct sensory information and which are merely consequences of our interpretation." (David E Rumelhart, "Schemata: The building blocks of cognition", 1980)

"Mental schemas are not rigid. By lasting and laborious processes the mental schemas accommodate themselves, in the long run, to the features of real situations and become progressively more fit to manage them and to solve the problems with which we are faced. Each period of mental development is characterized by a system. of basic mental schemas which determine the capacity of the child to learn, to interpret, and to use the information he gets." (Efraim Fischbein, "Intuition and Proof", For The Leaning of Mathematics 3 (2), 1982)

"The basic idea is that schemata are data structures for representing the generic concepts stored in memory. There are schemata for generalized concepts underlying objects, situations, events, sequences of events, actions, and sequences of actions. Roughly, schemata are like models of the outside world. To process information with the use of a schema is to determine which model best fits the incoming information. Ultimately, consistent configurations of schemata are discovered which, in concert, offer the best account for the input. This configuration of schemata together constitutes the interpretation of the input. (David E Rumelhart, Paul Smolensky, James L McClelland & Geoffrey E Hinton, "Schemata and sequential thought processes in PDP models", 1986)

"If we are to have meaningful, connected experiences; ones that we can comprehend and reason about; we must be able to discern patterns to our actions, perceptions, and conceptions. Underlying our vast network of interrelated literal meanings (all of those words about objects and actions) are those imaginative structures of understanding such as schema and metaphor, such as the mental imagery that allows us to extrapolate a path, or zoom in on one part of the whole, or zoom out until the trees merge into a forest." (William H Calvin, "The Cerebral Code", 1996)

[Schemata are] knowledge structures that represent objects or events and provide default assumptions about their characteristics, relationships, and entailments under conditions of incomplete information. (Paul J. DiMaggio, "Culture and Cognition", Annual Review of Sociology 23, 1997)

🏷️Knowledge Representation: On Conceptual Models (Quotes)

"This making or imagining of models (not necessarily or usually a material model, but a conceptual model) is a recognised way of arriving at an understanding of recondite and ultra-sensual occurring say in the ether or elsewhere." (Hugh MacColl, Mind: a quarterly review of psychology and philosophy Vol. 14, 1905)

"Mere deductive logic, whether you clothe it in mathematical symbols and phraseology or whether you enlarge its scope into a more general symbolic technique, can never take the place of clear relevant initial concepts of the meaning of your symbols, and among symbols I include words. If you are dealing with nature, your meanings must directly relate to the immediate facts of observation. We have to analyse first the most general characteristics of things observed, and then the more casual contingent occurrences. There can be no true physical science which looks first to mathematics for the provision of a conceptual model. Such a procedure is to repeat the errors of the logicians of the middle-ages." (Alfred N Whitehead, "Principle of Relativity", 1922)

"The 'physical' does not mean any particular kind of reality, but a particular kind of denoting reality, namely a system of concepts in the natural sciences which is necessary for the cognition of reality. 'The physical' should not be interpreted wrongly as an attribute of one part of reality, but not of the other ; it is rather a word denoting a kind of conceptual construction, as, e.g., the markers 'geographical' or 'mathematical', which denote not any distinct properties of real things, but always merely a manner of presenting them by means of ideas." (Moritz Schlick, "Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre", 1925)

"The rule is derived inductively from experience, therefore does not have any inner necessity, is always valid only for special cases and can anytime be refuted by opposite facts. On the contrary, the law is a logical relation between conceptual constructions; it is therefore deductible from upper laws and enables the derivation of lower laws; it has as such a logical necessity in concordance with its upper premises; it is not a mere statement of probability, but has a compelling, apodictic logical value once its premises are accepted."(Ludwig von Bertalanffy, "Kritische Theorie der Formbildung", 1928)

"Scientists whose work has no clear, practical implications would want to make their decisions considering such things as: the relative worth of (1) more observations, (2) greater scope of his conceptual model, (3) simplicity, (4) precision of language, (5) accuracy of the probability assignment." (C West Churchman, "Costs, Utilities, and Values", 1956)

"We realize, however, that all scientific laws merely represent abstractions and idealizations expressing certain aspects of reality. Every science means a schematized picture of reality, in the sense that a certain conceptual construct is unequivocally related to certain features of order in reality […]" (Ludwig von Bertalanffy, "General System Theory", 1968)

"A conceptual model is neither idle nor faithful: it is, or rather it is supposed to be and so taken until further notice, an approximate representation of a real thing." (Mario Bunge, "Philosophy of Physics", 1972)

"But metaphor is an indispensable tool of thought and expression - a characteristic of all human communication, even of that of the scientist. The conceptual models of cybernetics and the energy theories of psycho-analysis are, after all, only labeled metaphors." (Gregory Bateson, "Steps to an Ecology of Mind", 1972)

"[…] conceptual models, even when incorrect, are useful to the extent that criticism of the model may point to new theoretical developments."  (Gregory Bateson, "Steps to an Ecology of Mind", 1972)

"Whether or not a given conceptual model or representation of a physical system happens to be picturable, is irrelevant to the semantics of the theory to which it eventually becomes attached. Picturability is a fortunate psychological occurrence, not a scientific necessity. Few of the models that pass for visual representations are picturable anyhow. For one thing, the model may be and usually is constituted by imperceptible items such as unextended particles and invisible fields. True, a model can be given a graphic representation - but so can any idea as long as symbolic or conventional diagrams are allowed. Diagrams, whether representational or symbolic, are meaningless unless attached to some body of theory. On the other hand theories are in no need of diagrams save for psychological purposes. Let us then keep theoretical models apart from visual analogues."  (Mario Bunge, "Philosophy of Physics", 1973)

"A conceptual model is a qualitative description of the system and includes the processes taking place in the system, the parameters chosen to describe the processes, and the spatial and temporal scales of the processes." (A Avogadro & R C Ragaini, "Technologies for Environmental Cleanup", 1993)

"A conceptual model is a model of the projected system that is independent of implementation details." (Michael Worboys, "GIS: A Computing Perspective", 1995)

"A conceptual model is what in the model theory is called a set of formulas making statements about the world." (Dickson Lukose [Eds.], "Conceptual Structures: Fulfilling Peirce's Dream" Vol 5, 1997)

"A conceptual model is a representation of the system expertise using this formalism. An internal model is derived from the conceptual model and from a specification of the system transactions and the performance constraints." (Zbigniew W. Ras & Andrzej Skowron [Eds.], Foundations of Intelligent Systems: 10th International Symposium Vol 10, 1997)

"When we entrust the domain of values to those whose intellectual concerns are essentially centred on empirical facts, and whose conceptual frameworks are inevitably constructed around sets of empirical facts, we need not be surprised if the result is moral confusion." (Ronald W K Paterson, "The New Patricians", 1998)

"The purpose of a conceptual model is to provide a vocabulary of terms and concepts that can be used to describe problems and/or solutions of design. It is not the purpose of a model to address specific problems, and even less to propose solutions for them. Drawing an analogy with linguistics, a conceptual model is analogous to a language, while design patterns are analogous to rhetorical figures, which are predefined templates of language usages, suited particularly to specific problems." (Peter P Chen [Ed.], "Advances in Conceptual Modeling", 1999)

"The understanding of a thing begins and ends with some conceptual model of it. The model is the better, the more accurate, and inclusive. But even rough models can be used to guide - or misguide - research." (Bunge A Mario, "Philosophy in Crisis: The Need for Reconstruction", 2001) 

"As the least conscious layer of the user experience, the conceptual model has the paradoxical quality of also having the most impact on usability. If an appropriate conceptual model is faithfully represented throughout the interface, after users recognize and internalize the model, they will have a fundamental understanding of what the application does and how to operate it." (Bob Baxley, "Making the Web Work: Designing Effective Web Applications", 2002) 

"Sometimes, however, a conceptual model is only a first step, and the second step is a mathematical representation of the conceptual model." (Gregory N Derry, "What Science Is and How It Works", 2002) 

"A conceptual model is one which reflects reality by placing words which are concepts into the model in the same way that the model aeroplane builder puts wings, a fuselage, and a cockpit together." (Lynn Basford & ‎Oliver Slevin, "Theory and Practice of Nursing: An Integrated Approach to Caring Practice", 2003) 

"A conceptual model is simply a framework or schematic to understand the interaction of workforce education and development systems with other variables in a society." (Jay W Rojewski, "International Perspectives on Workforce Education and Development", 2004)

"A conceptual model is a mental image of a system, its components, its interactions. It lays the foundation for more elaborate models, such as physical or numerical models. A conceptual model provides a framework in which to think about the workings of a system or about problem solving in general. An ensuing operational model can be no better than its underlying conceptualization." (Henry N Pollack, "Uncertain Science … Uncertain World", 2005)

"[...] a single thing may elicit several appearances, various conceptual models of it, or several plans of action for it, depending on the subject’s abilities and interests." (Mario Bunge, "Chasing Reality: Strife over Realism", 2006)

"Although fiction is not fact, paradoxically we need some fictions, particularly mathematical ideas and highly idealized models, to describe, explain, and predict facts.  This is not because the universe is mathematical, but because our brains invent or use refined and law-abiding fictions, not only for intellectual pleasure but also to construct conceptual models of reality." (Mario Bunge, "Chasing Reality: Strife over Realism", 2006)

"At all events, our world pictures may have components of all three kinds: perceptual, conceptual, and praxiological (action-theoretical).  This is because there are three gates to the outer world: perception, conception, and action. However, ordinarily only one or two of them need be opened: combinations of all three, as in building a house according to a blueprint, are the exception.  We may contemplate a landscape without forming either a conceptual model of it or a plan to act upon it.  And we may build a theoretical model of an imperceptible thing, such as an invisible extrasolar planet, on which we cannot act." (Mario Bunge, "Chasing Reality: Strife over Realism", 2006)

"The role of conceptual modelling in information systems development during all these decades is seen as an approach for capturing fuzzy, ill-defined, informal 'real-world' descriptions and user requirements, and then transforming them to formal, in some sense complete, and consistent conceptual specifications." (Janis A Burbenko jr., "From Information Algebra to Enterprise Modelling and Ontologies", Conceptual Modelling in Information Systems Engineering, 2007) 

"Like a physical model, a conceptual model is an artificial system. It is however, made up of conceptual, and not physical components." (Ibrahim A Halloun, "Modeling Theory in Science Education", 2007) 

"The first function of a conceptual model is relating the research to the existing body of literature. With the help of a conceptual model a researcher can indicate in what way he is looking at the phenomenon of his research."(Jan Jonker & Bartjan Pennink, "The Essence of Research Methodology" , 2010) 

"A conceptual model is a qualitative description of 'some aspect of the behaviour of a natural system'. This description is usually verbal, but may also be accompanied by figures and graphs." (Howard S Wheater et al., "Groundwater Modelling in Arid and Semi-Arid Areas, 2010) 

"[…] a conceptual model is a diagram connecting variables and constructs based on theory and logic that displays the hypotheses to be tested." (Mary Wolfinbarger Celsi et al, "Essentials of Business Research Methods", 2011) 

"A conceptual model of an interactive application is, in summary: the structure of the application - the objects and their operations, attributes, and relation-ships; an idealized view of the how the application works – the model designers hope users will internalize; the mechanism by which users accomplish the tasks the application is intended to support." (Jeff Johnson & Austin Henderson, "Conceptual Models", 2011)

"Conceptual models are best thought of as design-tools - a way for designers to straighten out and simplify the design and match it to the users’ task-domain, thereby making it clearer to users how they should think about the application. The designers’ responsibility is to devise a conceptual model that seems natural to users based on the users’ familiarity with the task domain. If designers do their job well, the conceptual model will be the basis for users’ mental models of the application." (Jeff Johnson & Austin Henderson, "Conceptual Models", 2011)

"The conceptual model is not the users’ mental model of the application. […] users of an application form mental models of it to allow them to predict its behavior. A mental model is the user’s high-level understanding of how the application works; it allows the user to predict what the application will do in response to various user-actions. Ideally, a user’s mental model of an application should be similar to the designers’ conceptual model, but in practice the two models may differ significantly. Even if a user’s mental model is the same as the designer’s conceptual model, they are distinct models." (Jeff Johnson & Austin Henderson, "Conceptual Models", 2011)

"Simply put, a conceptual model is a simplified representation of reality, devised for a certain purpose and seen from a certain point of view."(David W Emble & Bernhard Thalheim, "Handbook of Conceptual Modeling", 2012) 

"Briefly, a conceptual model is the configuration of conceptual elements and the navigation between them. As such, a conceptual model is the foundation of the user interface of any interactive system." (Avi Parush, "Conceptual Design for Interactive Systems", 2015)

"A conceptual model is a framework that is initially used in research to outline the possible courses of action or to present an idea or thought. When a conceptual model is developed in a logical manner, it will provide a rigor to the research process." (N Elangovan & R Rajendran, "Conceptual Model: A Framework for Institutionalizing the Vigor in Business Research", 2015) 

"Once we understand our user's mental model, we can capture it in a conceptual model. The conceptual model is a representation of the mental model using elements, relationships, and conditions. Our design and final system will be the tangible result of this conceptual model." (Pau Giner & Pablo Perea, "UX Design for Mobile, 2017) 

"A model or conceptual model is a schematic or representation that describes how something works. We create and adapt models all the time without realizing it. Over time, as you gain more information about a problem domain, your model will improve to better match reality." (James Padolsey, "Clean Code in JavaScript", 2020)

🏷️Knowledge Representation: On Diagrams (Quotes)

"[…] the speculative propositions of mathematics do not relate to facts; […] all that we are convinced of by any demonstration in the science, is of a necessary connection subsisting between certain suppositions and certain conclusions. When we find these suppositions actually take place in a particular instance, the demonstration forces us to apply the conclusion. Thus, if I could form a triangle, the three sides of which were accurately mathematical lines, I might affirm of this individual figure, that its three angles are equal to two right angles; but as the imperfection of my senses puts it out of my power to be, in any case, certain of the exact correspondence of the diagram which I delineate, with the definitions given in the elements of geometry, I never can apply with confidence to a particular figure, a mathematical theorem. On the other hand, it appears from the daily testimony of our senses that the speculative truths of geometry may be applied to material objects with a degree of accuracy sufficient for the purposes of life; and from such applications of them, advantages of the most important kind have been gained to society." (Dugald Stewart, "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind", 1792)

"They [diagrams] are designed not so much to allow of reference to particular numbers, which can be better had from printed tables of figures, as to exhibit to the eye the general results of large masses of figures which it is hopeless to attack in any other way than by graphical representation." (William S Jevons, [letter to Richard Hutton] 1863)

"[…] it must be noticed that these diagrams do not naturally harmonize with the propositions of ordinary life or ordinary logic. […] The great bulk of the propositions which we commonly meet with are founded, and rightly founded, on an imperfect knowledge of the actual mutual relations of the implied classes to one another. […] one very marked characteristic about these circular diagrams is that they forbid the natural expression of such uncertainty, and are therefore only directly applicable to a very small number of such propositions as we commonly meet with." (John Venn, "On the Diagrammatic and Mechanical Representation of Propositions and Reasonings", 1880)

"I call a sign which stands for something merely because it resembles it, an icon. Icons are so completely substituted for their objects as hardly to be distinguished from them. Such are the diagrams of geometry. A diagram, indeed, so far as it has a general signification, is not a pure icon; but in the middle part of our reasonings we forget that abstractness in great measure, and the diagram is for us the very thing. So in contemplating a painting, there is a moment when we lose the consciousness that it is not the thing, the distinction of the real and the copy disappears, and it is for the moment a pure dream, - not any particular existence, and yet not general. At that moment we are contemplating an icon." (Charles S Peirce, "On The Algebra of Logic : A Contribution to the Philosophy of Notation" in The American Journal of Mathematics 7, 1885)

“Deduction is that mode of reasoning which examines the state of things asserted in the premises, forms a diagram of that state of things, perceives in the parts of the diagram relations not explicitly mentioned in the premises, satisfies itself by mental experiments upon the diagram that these relations would always subsist, or at least would do so in a certain proportion of cases, and concludes their necessary, or probable, truth.” (Charles S Peirce, “Kinds of Reasoning”, cca. 1896)

"We form in the imagination some sort of diagrammatic, that is, iconic, representation of the facts, as skeletonized as possible. The impression of the present writer is that with ordinary persons this is always a visual image, or mixed visual and muscular; but this is an opinion not founded on any systematic examination." (Charles S Peirce, "Notes on Ampliative Reasoning", 1901)

"We imagine cases, place mental diagrams before our mind's eye, and multiply these cases, until a habit is formed of expecting that always to turn out the case, which has been seen to be the result in all the diagrams. To appeal to such a habit is a very different thing from appealing to any immediate instinct of rationality. That the process of forming a habit of reasoning by the use of diagrams is often performed there is no room for doubt. It is perfectly open to consciousness." (Charles S Peirce,"Fallibility of Reasoning and the Feeling of Rationality", cca. 1902)

"Arithmetical symbols are written diagrams and geometrical figures are graphic formulas." (David Hilbert, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, Mathematical Problems Vol. 8, 1902)

"A diagram is a representamen [representation] which is predominantly an icon of relations and is aided to be so by conventions. Indices are also more or less used. It should be carried out upon a perfectly consistent system of representation, founded upon a simple and easily intelligible basic idea." (Charles S Peirce, 1903)

"A diagram is an icon or schematic image embodying the meaning of a general predicate; and from the observation of this icon we are supposed to construct a new general predicate." (Charles S Peirce, "New Elements" ["Kaina stoiceia"], 1904) 

"A theorem […] is an inference obtained by constructing a diagram according to a general precept, and after modifying it as ingenuity may dictate, observing in it certain relations, and showing that they must subsist in every case, retranslating the proposition into general terms." (Charles S Peirce, "New Elements" ["Kaina stoiceia"], 1904)

"Diagrammatic reasoning is the only really fertile reasoning. If logicians would only embrace this method, we should no longer see attempts to base their science on the fragile foundations of metaphysics or a psychology not based on logical theory; and there would soon be such an advance in logic that every science would feel the benefit of it." (Charles S Peirce, "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism", Monist 16(4), 1906)

"To facilitate eyeless observation of his sense-transcending world, the mathematician invokes the aid of physical diagrams and physical symbols in endless variety and combination [...]" (Cassius J Keyser, "Lectures on Science, Philosophy and Art", 1907-1908, 1908)

"This diagrammatic method has, however, serious inconveniences as a method for solving logical problems. It does not show how the data are exhibited by cancelling certain constituents, nor does it show how to combine the remaining constituents so as to obtain the consequences sought. In short, it serves only to exhibit one single step in the argument, namely the equation of the problem; it dispenses neither with the previous steps, i.e., 'throwing of the problem into an equation' and the transformation of the premises, nor with the subsequent steps, i.e., the combinations that lead to the various consequences. Hence it is of very little use, inasmuch as the constituents can be represented by algebraic symbols quite as well as by plane regions, and are much easier to deal with in this form." (Louis Couturat, "The Algebra of Logic", 1914)

"We rise from the conception of form to an understanding of the forces which gave rise to it. [...] in the representation of form we see a diagram of forces in equilibrium, and in the comparison of kindred forms we discern the magnitude and the direction of the forces which have sufficed to convert the one form into the other." (D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson, "On Growth and Form" Vol. II, 1917)

"The preliminary examination of most data is facilitated by the use of diagrams. Diagrams prove nothing, but bring outstanding features readily to the eye; they are therefore no substitutes for such critical tests as may be applied to the data, but are valuable in suggesting such tests, and in explaining the conclusions founded upon them." (Sir Ronald A Fisher, "Statistical Methods for Research Workers", 1925)

"What the diagram has in common with the symbolic schema is the fact that the diagram spatially represents an abstract and unextended object. But there is here nothing other than a determinate location in space. This location serves as a mooring, an attachment, an orientation for our memory, but does not play any role in our thought." (Jean-Paul Sartre, "The Imaginary: A phenomenological psychology of the imagination", 1940)

"[…] statistical literacy. That is, the ability to read diagrams and maps; a 'consumer' understanding of common statistical terms, as average, per cent, dispersion, correlation, and index number." (Douglas Scates, “Statistics: The Mathematics for Social Problems”, 1943)

"When I undertake some geometrical research, I have generally a mental view of the diagram itself, though generally an inadequate or incomplete one, in spite of which it affords the necessary synthesis - a tendency which, it would appear, results from a training which goes back to my very earliest childhood." (Jacques Hadamard, "The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field”, 1949)

"I believe, that the decisive idea which brings the solution of a problem is rather often connected with a well-turned word or sentence. The word or the sentence enlightens the situation, gives things, as you say, a physiognomy. It can precede by little the decisive idea or follow on it immediately; perhaps, it arises at the same time as the decisive idea. […] The right word, the subtly appropriate word, helps us to recall the mathematical idea, perhaps less completely and less objectively than a diagram or a mathematical notation, but in an analogous way. […] It may contribute to fix it in the mind." (George Polya [in a letter to Jaque Hadamard, "The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field", 1949])

"A logic machine is a device, electrical or mechanical, designed specifically for solving problems in formal logic. A logic diagram is a geometrical method for doing the same thing. […] A logic diagram is a two-dimensional geometric figure with spatial relations that are isomorphic with the structure of a logical statement. These spatial relations are usually of a topological character, which is not surprising in view of the fact that logic relations are the primitive relations underlying all deductive reasoning and topological properties are, in a sense, the most fundamental properties of spatial structures. Logic diagrams stand in the same relation to logical algebras as the graphs of curves stand in relation to their algebraic formulas; they are simply other ways of symbolizing the same basic structure." (Martin Gardner, "Logic Machines and Diagrams", 1958)

"The diagrams and circles aid the understanding by making it easy to visualize the elements of a given argument. They have considerable mnemonic value […] They have rhetorical value, not only arousing interest by their picturesque, cabalistic character, but also aiding in the demonstration of proofs and the teaching of doctrines. It is an investigative and inventive art. When ideas are combined in all possible ways, the new combinations start the mind thinking along novel channels and one is led to discover fresh truths and arguments, or to make new inventions. Finally, the Art possesses a kind of deductive power." (Martin Gardner, "Logic Machines and Diagrams", 1958) 

"An information retrieval system is therefore defined here as any device which aids access to documents specified by subject, and the operations associated with it. The documents can be books, journals, reports, atlases, or other records of thought, or any parts of such records - articles, chapters, sections, tables, diagrams, or even particular words. The retrieval devices can range from a bare list of contents to a large digital computer and its accessories. The operations can range from simple visual scanning to the most detailed programming." (Brian C Vickery, "The Structure of Information Retrieval Systems", 1959)

"A model is a qualitative or quantitative representation of a process or endeavor that shows the effects of those factors which are significant for the purposes being considered. A model may be pictorial, descriptive, qualitative, or generally approximate in nature; or it may be mathematical and quantitative in nature and reasonably precise. It is important that effective means for modeling be understood such as analog, stochastic, procedural, scheduling, flow chart, schematic, and block diagrams." (Harold Chestnut, "Systems Engineering Tools", 1965) 

"A diagram thus enables us to discover the internal categorization which characterizes the information being processed in a much shorter time than does a map. […] A diagram permits the rapid and precise internal processing of information having three components, but it does not permit introducing the information into a universal system of visual memorization and geographic comparison. It is a closed graphic system, limited solely to the information being processed. […] In a diagram, one begins by attributing a meaning to the planar dimensions, then one plots the correspondences." (Jacques Bertin, "Semiology of graphics", 1967) 

"A graphic is a diagram when correspondences on the plane can be established among all elements of another component." (Jacques Bertin, "Semiology of graphics", 1967) 

"To analyse graphic representation precisely, it is helpful to distinguish it from musical, verbal and mathematical notations, all of which are perceived in a linear or temporal sequence. The graphic image also differs from figurative representation essentially polysemic, and from the animated image, governed by the laws of cinematographic time. Within the boundaries of graphics fall the fields of networks, diagrams and maps. The domain of graphic imagery ranges from the depiction of atomic structures to the representation of galaxies and extends into the spheres of topography and cartography."  (Jacques Bertin, "Semiology of graphics", 1967) 

"When the correspondences on the plane can be established between: - all the divisions of one component - and all the divisions of another component, the construction is a DIAGRAM." (Jacques Bertin, "Semiology of graphics", 1967) 

"Pure mathematics are concerned only with abstract propositions, and have nothing to do with the realities of nature. There is no such thing in actual existence as a mathematical point, line or surface. There is no such thing as a circle or square. But that is of no consequence. We can define them in words, and reason about them. We can draw a diagram, and suppose that line to be straight which is not really straight, and that figure to be a circle which is not strictly a circle. It is conceived therefore by the generality of observers, that mathematics is the science of certainty." (William Godwin, "Thoughts on Man", 1969)

"A diagram is worth a thousand proofs." (Carl E Linderholm, "Mathematics Made Difficult", 1971)

"The result of the implementation, the logical design, is traditionally shown as a series of block diagrams. These blocks represent in effect a series of statements, Actually, a direct presentation of these statements is more suitable and, although less familiar, more easily understood. The Harvard Mark IV was to large degree designed and described by such statements, as has been the case with several subsequent developments." (Gerrit Blaauw, "Computer Architecture", 1972) 

"Whether or not a given conceptual model or representation of a physical system happens to be picturable, is irrelevant to the semantics of the theory to which it eventually becomes attached. Picturability is a fortunate psychological occurrence, not a scientific necessity. Few of the models that pass for visual representations are picturable anyhow. For one thing, the model may be and usually is constituted by imperceptible items such as unextended particles and invisible fields. True, a model can be given a graphic representation - but so can any idea as long as symbolic or conventional diagrams are allowed. Diagrams, whether representational or symbolic, are meaningless unless attached to some body of theory. On the other hand theories are in no need of diagrams save for psychological purposes. Let us then keep theoretical models apart from visual analogues."  (Mario Bunge, "Philosophy of Physics", 1973)

"Pencil and paper for construction of distributions, scatter diagrams, and run-charts to compare small groups and to detect trends are more efficient methods of estimation than statistical inference that depends on variances and standard errors, as the simple techniques preserve the information in the original data." (W Edwards Deming, "On Probability as Basis for Action", American Statistician, Volume 29, Number 4, November 1975)

"The formalist makes a distinction between geometry as a deductive structure and geometry as a descriptive science. Only the first is regarded as mathematical. The use of pictures or diagrams, or even mental imagery, all are non- mathematical. In principle, they should be unnecessary. Consequently. he regards them as inappropriate in a mathematics text, perhaps even in a mathematics class." (Philip J Davis & Reuben Hersh, "The Mathematical Experience", 1981)

"The thinking person goes over the same ground many times. He looks at it from varying points of view - his own, his arch-enemy’s, others’. He diagrams it, verbalizes it, formulates equations, constructs visual images of the whole problem, or of troublesome parts, or of what is clearly known. But he does not keep a detailed record of all this mental work, indeed could not. […] Deep understanding of a domain of knowledge requires knowing it in various ways. This multiplicity of perspectives grows slowly through hard work and sets the state for the re-cognition we experience as a new insight." (Howard E Gruber, "Darwin on Man", 1981)

"[The diagram] is only an heuristic to prompt certain trains of inference; [...] it is dispensable as a proof-theoretic device; indeed, [...] it has no proper place in the proof as such. For the proof is a syntactic object consisting only of sentences arranged in a finite and inspectable array." (Neil Tennant, "The withering away of formal semantics", Mind and Language Vol. 1 (4), 1986)

"We distinguish diagrammatic from sentential paper-and-pencil representations of information by developing alternative models of information-processing systems that are informationally equivalent and that can be characterized as sentential or diagrammatic. Sentential representations are sequential, like the propositions in a text. Diagrammatic representations are indexed by location in a plane. Diagrammatic representations also typically display information that is only implicit in sentential representations and that therefore has to be computed, sometimes at great cost, to make it explicit for use. We then contrast the computational efficiency of these representations for solving several. illustrative problems in mathematics and physics." (Herbert A. Simon, "Why a diagram is (sometimes) worth ten thousand words", 1987) 

"People who have a casual interest in mathematics may get the idea that a topologist is a mathematical playboy who spends his time making Möbius bands and other diverting topological models. If they were to open any recent textbook in topology, they would be surprised. They would find page after page of symbols, seldom relieved by a picture or diagram." (Martin Gardner, "Hexaflexagons and Other Mathematical Diversions", 1988)

"The value of diagram techniques even at this rudimentary level should be clear by now: it is easier to visualize where simplifications may be found in a complicated network by searching for a reducible linkage than by examining a complicated algebraic expression."(Geoffrey E Stedman, "Diagram Techniques in Group Theory", 1990)

"Diagrams are physical situations. They must be, since we can see them. As such, they obey their own set of constraints. […] By choosing a representational scheme appropriately, so that the constraints on the diagrams have a good match with the constraints on the described situation, the diagram can generate a lot of information that the user never need infer. Rather, the user can simply read off facts from the diagram as needed." (Jon Barwise & John Etchemendy, "Visual information and valid reasoning", [in "Visualization in Teaching and Learning Mathematics"], 1991)

"It has been said that the art of geometry is to reason well from false diagrams." (Jean Dieudonné, "Mathematics - The Music of Reason", 1992)

"A mental model is not normally based on formal definitions but rather on concrete properties that have been drawn from life experience. Mental models are typically analogs, and they comprise specific contents, but this does not necessarily restrict their power to deal with abstract concepts, as we will see. The important thing about mental models, especially in the context of mathematics, is the relations they represent. We will use diagrams to depict mental models for a variety of concepts, and it is important to keep in mind that any diagram, or even a non-diagrammatic representation that represents the same essential relations would be equally effective." (Lyn D English & Graeme S Halford," "Mathematics Education: Models and Processes", 1995) 

"Schematic diagrams are more abstract than pictorial drawings, showing symbolic elements and their interconnection to make clear the configuration and/or operation of a system." (Ernest O Doebelin, "Engineering experimentation: planning, execution, reporting", 1995)

"Given particular tasks of reasoning, different types of diagrams show different degrees of suitedness. For example, Euler diagrams are superior in handling certain problems concerning inclusion and membership among classes and individuals, but they cannot be generally applied to such problems without special provisos. Diagrams make many proofs in geometry shorter and more intuitive, while they take certain precautions of the reasoner's to be used validly. […] Mathematicians experience that coming up with the 'right' sorts of diagrams is more than half-way to the solution of most complicated problems." (Atsushi Shimojima, "Operational Constraints in Diagrammatic Reasoning" , [in "Logical Reasoning with Diagrams"], 1996)

"Making a good choice of representational conventions is always important in solving a problem, but especially true of charts. This sensitivity of type of chart to the particularities of the task at hand makes a very general logic of charts useless." (Jon Barwise & Eric Hammer, "Diagrams and the Concept of Logical System", [in "Logical Reasoning with Diagrams"], 1996)

"Mathematicians, like the rest of us, cherish clever ideas; in particular they delight in an ingenious picture. But this appreciation does not overwhelm a prevailing skepticism. After all, a diagram is - at best - just a special case and so can't establish a general theorem. Even worse, it can be downright misleading. Though not universal, the prevailing attitude is that pictures are really no more than heuristic devices; they are psychologically suggestive and pedagogically important - but they prove nothing. I want to oppose this view and to make a case for pictures having a legitimate role to play as evidence and justification - a role well beyond the heuristic.  In short, pictures can prove theorems." (James R Brown, "Philosophy of Mathematics: An Introduction to the World of Proofs and Pictures", 1999)

"Concept maps have long provided visual languages widely used in many different disciplines and application domains. Abstractly, they are sorted graphs visually represented as nodes having a type, name and content, some of which are linked by arcs. Concretely, they are structured diagrams having discipline- and domain-specific interpretations for their user communities, and, sometimes, formally defining computer data structures. Concept maps have been used for a wide range of purposes and it would be useful to make such usage available over the World Wide Web." (Brian R. Gaines, "WebMap: Concept Mapping on the Web", 2001) 

"Always remember that the model is not the diagram. The diagram’s purpose is to help communicate and explain the model. The code can serve as a repository of the details of the design." (Eric Evans, "Domain-Driven Design: Tackling complexity in the heart of software", 2003)

"Data is transformed into graphics to understand. A map, a diagram are documents to be interrogated. But understanding means integrating all of the data. In order to do this it’s necessary to reduce it to a small number of elementary data. This is the objective of the 'data treatment' be it graphic or mathematic." (Jacques Bertin [interview], 2003)

"Diagrams are a means of communication and explanation, and they facilitate brainstorming. They serve these ends best if they are minimal. Comprehensive diagrams of the entire object model fail to communicate or explain; they overwhelm the reader with detail and they lack meaning." (Eric Evans, "Domain-Driven Design: Tackling complexity in the heart of software", 2003)

"Science does not speak of the world in the language of words alone, and in many cases it simply cannot do so. The natural language of science is a synergistic integration of words, diagrams, pictures, graphs, maps, equations, tables, charts, and other forms of visual and mathematical expression. [… Science thus consists of] the languages of visual representation, the languages of mathematical symbolism, and the languages of experimental operations." (Jay Lemke, "Teaching all the languages of science: Words, symbols, images and actions", 2003)

"Graphical design notations have been with us for a while [...] their primary value is in communication and understanding. A good diagram can often help communicate ideas about a design, particularly when you want to avoid a lot of details. Diagrams can also help you understand either a software system or a business process. As part of a team trying to figure out something, diagrams both help understanding and communicate that understanding throughout a team. Although they aren't, at least yet, a replacement for textual programming languages, they are a helpful assistant." (Martin Fowler," UML Distilled: A Brief Guide to the Standard Object Modeling", 2004)

"A diagram is a graphic shorthand. Though it is an ideogram, it is not necessarily an abstraction. It is a representation of something in that it is not the thing itself. In this sense, it cannot help but be embodied. It can never be free of value or meaning, even when it attempts to express relationships of formation and their processes. At the same time, a diagram is neither a structure nor an abstraction of structure." (Peter Eisenman, "Written Into the Void: Selected Writings", 1990-2004, 2007)

"A modeling language is usually based on some kind of computational model, such as a state machine, data flow, or data structure. The choice of this model, or a combination of many, depends on the modeling target. Most of us make this choice implicitly without further thinking: some systems call for capturing dynamics and thus we apply for example state machines, whereas other systems may be better specified by focusing on their static structures using feature diagrams or component diagrams. For these reasons a variety of modeling languages are available." (Steven Kelly & Juha-Pekka Tolvanen, "Domain-specific Modeling", 2008)

"[…] a conceptual model is a diagram connecting variables and constructs based on theory and logic that displays the hypotheses to be tested." (Mary Wolfinbarger Celsi et al, "Essentials of Business Research Methods", 2011)

"Diagrams furnish only approximate information. They do not add anything to the meaning of the data and, therefore, are not of much use to a statistician or research worker for further mathematical treatment or statistical analysis. On the other hand, graphs are more obvious, precise and accurate than the diagrams and are quite helpful to the statistician for the study of slopes, rates of change and estimation, (interpolation and extrapolation), wherever possible." (S C Gupta & Indra Gupta, "Business Statistics", 2013)

"Systems archetypes thus provide a good starting theory from which we can develop further insights into the nature of a particular system. The diagram that results from working with an archetype should not be viewed as the 'truth', however, but rather a good working model of what we know at any point in time." (Daniel H Kim, "Systems Archetypes as Dynamic Theories", The Systems Thinker Vol. 24 (1), 2013)

"As mathematics gets more abstract, diagrams become more and more prominent as the ways that things fit together abstractly become both more subtle and more important. Moreover, the diagram often sums up the situation more succinctly than the explanation in words, [..]" (Eugenia Cheng, "Beyond Infinity: An Expedition to the Outer Limits of Mathematics", 2017)

"Sometimes mathematical advances happen by just looking at something in a slightly different way, which doesn’t mean building something new or going somewhere different, it just means changing your perspective and opening up huge new possibilities as a result. This particular insight leads to calculus and hence the understanding of anything curved, anything in motion, anything fluid or continuously changing." (Eugenia Cheng, "Beyond Infinity: An Expedition to the Outer Limits of Mathematics", 2017)

"Models are formal structures represented in mathematics and diagrams that help us to understand the world. Mastery of models improves your ability to reason, explain, design, communicate, act, predict, and explore." (Scott E Page, "The Model Thinker", 2018)

🏷️Knowledge Representation: On Representation (Quotes)

"Sometimes a thing is perceived [via sense-perception] when it is observed; then it is imagined, when it is absent [in reality] through the representation of its form inside, Sense-perception grasps [the concept] insofar as it is buried in these accidents that cling to it because of the matter out of which it is made without abstracting it from [matter], and it grasps it only by means of a connection through position [ that exists] between its perception and its matter. It is for this reason that the form of [the thing] is not represented in the external sense when [sensation] ceases. As to the internal [faculty of] imagination, it imagines [the concept] together with these accidents, without being able to entirely abstract it from them. Still, [imagination] abstracts it from the afore-mentioned connection [through position] on which sense-perception depends, so that [imagination] represents the form [of the thing] despite the absence of the form's [outside] carrier." (Avicenna Latinus [Ibn Sina], "Pointer and Reminders", cca. 1030)

"Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (receptivity for impressions), the second is the power of knowing an object through these representations (spontaneity [in the production] of concepts)." (Immanuel Kant, "Critique of Pure Reason", 1781)

“Hence all these theories lead to the conception of a medium in which the propagation takes place, and if we admit this medium as an hypothesis, I think it ought to occupy a prominent place in our investigations, and that we ought to endeavour to construct a mental representation of all the details of its action, and this has been my constant aim in this treatise.” (James C Maxwell, “Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism” Vol. II, 1873)

"We produce these representations in and from ourselves with the same necessity with which the spider spins. If we are forced to comprehend all things only under these forms, then it ceases to be amazing that in all things we actually comprehend nothing but these forms. For they must all bear within themselves the laws of number, and it is precisely number which is most astonishing in things. All that conformity to law, which impresses us so much in the movement of the stars and in chemical processes, coincides at bottom with those properties which we bring to things. Thus it is we who impress ourselves in this way." (Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense", 1873) 

"The steps to scientific as well as other knowledge consist in a series of logical fictions which are as legitimate as they are indispensable in the operations of thought, but whose relations to the phenomena whereof they are the partial and not unfrequently merely symbolical representations must never be lost sight of." (John Stallo, "The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics", 1884) 

"The theory most prevalent among teachers is that mathematics affords the best training for the reasoning powers; […] The modem, and to my mind true, theory is that mathematics is the abstract form of the natural sciences; and that it is valuable as a training of the reasoning powers, not because it is abstract, but because it is a representation of actual things." (Truman H Safford, "Mathematical Teaching and Its Modern Methods", 1886)

"A symbolical representation of a method of calculation has the same significance for a mathematician as a model or a visualisable working hypothesis has for a physicist. The symbol, the model, the hypothesis runs parallel with the thing to be represented. But the parallelism may extend farther, or be extended farther, than was originally intended on the adoption of the symbol. Since the thing represented and the device representing are after all different, what would be concealed in the one is apparent in the other." (Ernst Mach, "Space and Geometry: In the Light of physiological, phycological and physical inquiry", 1906) 

"The sole purpose of physical theory is to provide a representation and classification of experimental laws; the only test permitting us to judge a physical theory and pronounce it good or bad is the comparison between the consequences of this theory and the experimental laws it has to represent and classify."  (Pierre-Maurice-Marie Duhem, “The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory”, 1908)

“A geometrical-physical theory as such is incapable of being directly pictured, being merely a system of concepts. But these concepts serve the purpose of bringing a multiplicity of real or imaginary sensory experiences into connection in the mind. To ‘visualise’ a theory, or bring it home to one's mind, therefore means to give a representation to that abundance of experiences for which the theory supplies the schematic arrangement” (Albert Einstein, “Geometry and Experience”, 1921)

"We wish to obtain a representation of phenomena and form an image of them in our minds. Till now, we have always attempted to form these images by means of the ordinary notions of time and space. These notions are perhaps innate; in any case they have been developed by our daily observations. For me, these notions are clear, and I confess that I am unable to gain any idea of physics without them. […] I would like to retain this ideal of other days and describe everything that occurs in this world in terms of clear pictures." (Hendrik A Lorentz, [Fifth Solvay Conference] 1927)

“It can scarcely be denied that the supreme goal of all theory is to make the irreducible basic elements as simple and as few as possible without having to surrender the adequate representation of a single datum of experience.” (Albert Einstein, [lecture] 1933)

"Although we can never devise a pictorial representation which shall be both true to nature and intelligible to our minds, we may still be able to make partial aspects of the truth comprehensible through pictorial representations or parables. As the whole truth does not admit of intelligible representation, every such pictorial representation or parable must fail somewhere. The physicist of the last generation was continually making pictorial representations and parables, and also making the mistake of treating the half-truths of pictorial representations and parables as literal truths.” (James H Jeans, “Physics and Philosophy” 3rd Ed., 1943)

"A material model is the representation of a complex system by a system which is assumed simpler and which is also assumed to have some properties similar to those selected for study in the original complex system. A formal model is a symbolic assertion in logical terms of an idealised relatively simple situation sharing the structural properties of the original factual system." (Arturo Rosenblueth & Norbert Wiener, "The Role of Models in Science", Philosophy of Science Vol. 12 (4), 1945)

“Representation of the world, like the world itself, is the work of men; they describe it from their own point of view, which they confuse with absolute truth.” (Simone de Beauvoir, “The Second Sex”, 1949)

"Mathematics, like music and poetry, is a creation of the mind; [...] the primary task of the mathematician, like that of any other artist, is to extend man's mental horizon by representation and interpretation." (Graham Sutton, "Mathematics in Action", 1954)

"We have thus assigned to pure reason and experience their places in a theoretical system of physics. The structure of the system is the work of reason: the empirical contents and their mutual relations must find their representation in the conclusions of the theory. In the possibility of such a representation lie the sole value and justification of the whole system, and especially of the concepts and fundamental principles which underlie it. Apart from that, these latter are free inventions of human intellect, which cannot be justified either by the nature of that intellect or in any other fashion a priori." (Albert Einstein, "Ideas and Opinions", 1954)

"[a pictorial representation] is not a faithful record of a visual experience, but the faithful construction of a relational model […] Such a model can be constructed to any required degree of accuracy . What is decisive here is clearly the word 'required'. The form of a representation cannot be divorced from its purpose and the requirements of the society in which the given visual language gains currency." (Ernst H Gombrich," Art and illusion", 1960)

"A more problematic example is the parallel between the increasingly abstract and insubstantial picture of the physical universe which modern physics has given us and the popularity of abstract and non-representational forms of art and poetry. In each case the representation of reality is increasingly removed from the picture which is immediately presented to us by our senses." (Harvey Brooks, "Scientific Concepts and Cultural Change", 1965)

"A model is a qualitative or quantitative representation of a process or endeavor that shows the effects of those factors which are significant for the purposes being considered. A model may be pictorial, descriptive, qualitative, or generally approximate in nature; or it may be mathematical and quantitative in nature and reasonably precise. It is important that effective means for modeling be understood such as analog, stochastic, procedural, scheduling, flow chart, schematic, and block diagrams." (Harold Chestnut, "Systems Engineering Tools", 1965)

"As is used in connection with systems engineering, a model is a qualitative or quantitative representation of a process or endeavor that shows the effects of those factors which are significant for the purposes being considered. Modeling is the process of making a model. Although the model may not represent the actual phenomenon in all respects, it does describe the essential inputs, outputs, and internal characteristics, as well as provide an indication of environmental conditions similar to those of actual equipment." (Harold Chestnut, "Systems Engineering Tools", 1965)

"We say the map is different from the territory. But what is the territory? Operationally, somebody went out with a retina or a measuring stick and made representations which were then put on paper. What is on the paper map is a representation of what was in the retinal representation of the man who made the map; and as you push the question back, what you find is an infinite regress, an infinite series of maps. The territory never gets in at all. […] Always, the process of representation will filter it out so that the mental world is only maps of maps, ad infinitum." (Gregory Bateson, "Steps to an Ecology of Mind", 1972)

“A model is an abstract description of the real world. It is a simple representation of more complex forms, processes and functions of physical phenomena and ideas.” (Moshe F Rubinstein & Iris R Firstenberg, “Patterns of Problem Solving”, 1975)

"[…] there is an irreducible difference between the world and our experience of it. We as human beings do not operate directly on the world. Each of us creates a representation of the world in which we live - that is, we create a map or model which we use to generate our behavior. Our representation of the world determines to a large degree what our experience of the world will be, how we will perceive the world, what choices we will see available to us as we live in the world." (Richard Bandler & John Grinder, "The Structure of Magic", 1975)

"The primitives of a representation are the most elementary units of shape information available in a representation." (David Marr, "Representation and recognition of the spatial organization of three-dimensional shapes", 1978) 

"A mental image occurs when a representation of the type created during the initial phases of perception is present but the stimulus is not actually being perceived; such representations preserve the perceptible properties of the stimulus and ultimately give rise to the subjective experience of perception." (Stephen M Kosslyn, "Image and Mind", 1980)

"Whenever I have talked about mental models, audiences have readily grasped that a layout of concrete objects can be represented by an internal spatial array, that a syllogism can be represented by a model of individuals and identities between them, and that a physical process can be represented by a three-dimensional dynamic model. Many people, however, have been puzzled by the representation of abstract discourse; they cannot understand how terms denoting abstract entities, properties or relations can be similarly encoded, and therefore they argue that these terms can have only 'verbal' or propositional representations." (Philip Johnson-Laird,"Mental Models: Towards a Cognitive Science of Language, Inference and Consciousness", 1983)

"The mapping from linguistic inputs to mental models is not a one-one mapping. So semantic properties of sentences may not be recoverable from a mental model. Reading or listening is typically for content not for form. People want to know what is being said to them, not how it is being said. [...] A mental model is a representation of the content of a text that need bear no resemblance to any of the text's linguistic representations. Its structure is similar to the situation described by the text." (Alan Granham, "Mental Models as Representations of Discourse and Text", 1987)

"When we focus consciously on an object - and create a mental image for eexample- it's not because the brain pattern is a copy or neural representation of the perceived object, but because the brain experiences a special kind of interaction with that object, preparing the brain to deal with it." (Roger W Sperry, "New Mindset on Consciousness", Sunrise magazine, 1987/1988)

“[…] a mental model is a mapping from a domain into a mental representation which contains the main characteristics of the domain; a model can be ‘run’ to generate explanations and expectations with respect to potential states. Mental models have been proposed in particular as the kind of knowledge structures that people use to understand a specific domain […]” (Helmut Jungermann, Holger Schütz & Manfred Thuering, “Mental models in risk assessment: Informing people about drugs”, Risk Analysis 8 (1), 1988)

"An important symptom of an emerging understanding is the capacity to represent a problem in a number of different ways and to approach its solution from varied vantage points; a single, rigid representation is unlikely to suffice." (Howard Gardner, "The Unschooled Mind", 1991)

"On this view, we recognize science to be the search for algorithmic compressions. We list sequences of observed data. We try to formulate algorithms that compactly represent the information content of those sequences. Then we test the correctness of our hypothetical abbreviations by using them to predict the next terms in the string. These predictions can then be compared with the future direction of the data sequence. Without the development of algorithmic compressions of data all science would be replaced by mindless stamp collecting - the indiscriminate accumulation of every available fact. Science is predicated upon the belief that the Universe is algorithmically compressible and the modern search for a Theory of Everything is the ultimate expression of that belief, a belief that there is an abbreviated representation of the logic behind the Universe's properties that can be written down in finite form by human beings." (John D Barrow, New Theories of Everything", 1991)

"Somehow the breathless world that we witness seems far removed from the timeless laws of Nature which govern the elementary particles and forces of Nature. The reason is clear. We do not observe the laws of Nature: we observe their outcomes. Since these laws find their most efficient representation as mathematical equations, we might say that we see only the solutions of those equations not the equations themselves. This is the secret which reconciles the complexity observed in Nature with the advertised simplicity of her laws." (John D Barrow, "New Theories of Everything", 1991)

"A world view is a system of co-ordinates or a frame of reference in which everything presented to us by our diverse experiences can be placed. It is a symbolic system of representation that allows us to integrate everything we know about the world and ourselves into a global picture, one that illuminates reality as it is presented to us within a certain culture. […] A world view is a coherent collection of concepts and theorems that must allow us to construct a global image of the world, and in this way to understand as many elements of our experience as possible.” (Diederick Aerts et al, "World views: From Fragmentation to Integration”, 1994)

"A mental model is not normally based on formal definitions but rather on concrete properties that have been drawn from life experience. Mental models are typically analogs, and they comprise specific contents, but this does not necessarily restrict their power to deal with abstract concepts, as we will see. The important thing about mental models, especially in the context of mathematics, is the relations they represent. […]  The essence of understanding a concept is to have a mental representation or mental model that faithfully reflects the structure of that concept. (Lyn D. English & Graeme S. Halford, "Mathematics Education: Models and Processes", 1995)

"The representational nature of maps, however, is often ignored - what we see when looking at a map is not the word, but an abstract representation that we find convenient to use in place of the world. When we build these abstract representations we are not revealing knowledge as much as are creating it." (Alan MacEachren, "How Maps Work: Representation, Visualization, and Design", 1995)

"Suppose the reasoning centers of the brain can get their hands on the mechanisms that plop shapes into the array and that read their locations out of it. Those reasoning demons can exploit the geometry of the array as a surrogate for keeping certain logical constraints in mind. Wealth, like location on a line, is transitive: if A is richer than B, and B is richer than C, then A is richer than C. By using location in an image to symbolize wealth, the thinker takes advantage of the transitivity of location built into the array, and does not have to enter it into a chain of deductive steps. The problem becomes a matter of plop down and look up. It is a fine example of how the form of a mental representation determines what is easy or hard to think." (Steven Pinker, "How the Mind Works", 1997)

"A certain theory of representation implies a certain theory of meaning - and meaning is what we live by." (Paul Cilliers, "Complexity and Postmodernism", 1998) 

"A model is an external and explicit representation of part of reality as seen by the people who wish to use that model to understand, to change, to manage, and to control that part of reality in some way or other." (Michael Pidd, "Just Modeling through: A Rough Guide to Modeling", Interfaces, Vol. 29, No. 2, 1999)

"In broad terms, a mental model is to be understood as a dynamic symbolic representation of external objects or events on the part of some natural or artificial cognitive system. Mental models are thought to have certain properties which make them stand out against other forms of symbolic representations." (Gert Rickheit & Lorenz Sichelschmidt, "Mental Models: Some Answers, Some Questions, Some Suggestions", 1999)

"What it means for a mental model to be a structural analog is that it embodies a representation of the spatial and temporal relations among, and the causal structures connecting the events and entities depicted and whatever other information that is relevant to the problem-solving talks. […] The essential points are that a mental model can be nonlinguistic in form and the mental mechanisms are such that they can satisfy the model-building and simulative constraints necessary for the activity of mental modeling." (Nancy J Nersessian, "Model-based reasoning in conceptual change", 1999)

“As archetypes of our representation of the world, numbers form, in the strongest sense, part of ourselves, to such an extent that it can legitimately be asked whether the subject of study of arithmetic is not the human mind itself. From this a strange fascination arises: how can it be that these numbers, which lie so deeply within ourselves, also give rise to such formidable enigmas? Among all these mysteries, that of the prime numbers is undoubtedly the most ancient and most resistant." (Gerald Tenenbaum & Michael M France, “The Prime Numbers and Their Distribution”, 2000)

"Sometimes, however, a conceptual model is only a first step, and the second step is a mathematical representation of the conceptual model." (Gregory N Derry, "What Science Is and How It Works", 2002)

"In complexity thinking the darkness principle is covered by the concept of incompressibility… The concept of incompressibility suggests that the best representation of a complex system is the system itself and that any representation other than the system itself will necessarily misrepresent certain aspects of the original system." (Kurt Richardson, "Systems theory and complexity: Part 1", Emergence: Complexity & Organization Vol.6 (3), 2004)

"But because of the way in which depictions represent, there is a correspondence between parts and spatial relations of the representation and those of the object; this structural mapping, which confers a type of resemblance, underlies the way images convey specific content. In this respect images are like pictures. Unlike words and symbols, depictions are not arbitrarily paired with what they represent." (Stephen Kosslyn et al, "The Case for Mental Imagery", 2006)

"A model is a representation in that it (or its properties) is chosen to stand for some other entity (or its properties), known as the target system. A model is a tool in that it is used in the service of particular goals or purposes; typically these purposes involve answering some limited range of questions about the target system." (Wendy S Parker, "Confirmation and Adequacy-for-Purpose in Climate Modelling", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 83, 2009)

"Mental models represent possibilities, and the theory of mental models postulates three systems of mental processes underlying inference: (0) the construction of an intensional representation of a premise’s meaning – a process guided by a parser; (1) the building of an initial mental model from the intension, and the drawing of a conclusion based on heuristics and the model; and (2) on some occasions, the search for alternative models, such as a counterexample in which the conclusion is false. System 0 is linguistic, and it may be autonomous. System 1 is rapid and prone to systematic errors, because it makes no use of a working memory for intermediate results. System 2 has access to working memory, and so it can carry out recursive processes, such as the construction of alternative models." (Sangeet Khemlania & P.N. Johnson-Laird, "The processes of inference", Argument and Computation, 2012)

"Simply put, a conceptual model is a simplified representation of reality, devised for a certain purpose and seen from a certain point of view." (David W Emble & Bernhard Thalheim, "Handbook of Conceptual Modeling", 2012)

“A mathematical model is a mathematical description (often by means of a function or an equation) of a real-world phenomenon such as the size of a population, the demand for a product, the speed of a falling object, the concentration of a product in a chemical reaction, the life expectancy of a person at birth, or the cost of emission reductions. The purpose of the model is to understand the phenomenon and perhaps to make predictions about future behavior. [...] A mathematical model is never a completely accurate representation of a physical situation - it is an idealization." (James Stewart, “Calculus: Early Transcedentals” 8th Ed., 2016)

“A mental model is not necessarily founded on facts or complete understanding of reality. Let's be honest, most of our mental models are flawed in many ways, and that's perfectly normal. They work because they are fast and simple and not because they are a complete representation of the reality. […] The most important thing about a person's mental model is that it's simplified and very limited compared to what it models.” (Peter W Szabo, “User Experience Mapping”, 2017)

"Once we understand our user's mental model, we can capture it in a conceptual model. The conceptual model is a representation of the mental model using elements, relationships, and conditions. Our design and final system will be the tangible result of this conceptual model." (Pau Giner & Pablo Perea, "UX Design for Mobile, 2017) 

"A model or conceptual model is a schematic or representation that describes how something works. We create and adapt models all the time without realizing it. Over time, as you gain more information about a problem domain, your model will improve to better match reality." (James Padolsey, "Clean Code in JavaScript", 2020)