"The mechanism of thought consists in combinations, separations, and recombinations of representative images or symbols […] the object of thought is adaptation to environment." (Paul Carus,"Le probeme de la conscience du moi", 1893)
"[…] there is something wonderful in the idea that man’s brain is the greatest machine of all, imitating within its tiny network events happening in the most distant stars, […] On our model theory neural or other mechanisms can imitate or parallel the behaviour and interaction of physical objects and so supply us with information on physical processes which are not directly observable to us." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)
"Thus there are instances of symbolisation in nature; we use such instances as an aid to thinking; there is evidence of similar mechanisms at work in our own sensory and central nervous systems; and the function of such symbolisation is plain. If the organism carries a ’small-scale model’ of external reality and of its own possible actions within its head, it is able to try out various alternatives, conclude which is the best of them, react to future situations before they arise […]" (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)
"The words of the language, as they are written or spoken, do not seem to play any role in any mechanism of thought. The physical entities which seem to serve as elements in thought are certain signs and more or less clear images which can be 'voluntarily' reproduced or combined. […] But taken from a psychological viewpoint, this combinatory play seems to be the essential feature in productive thought - before there is any connection with logical construction in words or other kinds of signs which can be communicated to others. The above-mentioned elements are, in my case, of visual and some of muscular type. Conventional words or other signs have to be sought for laboriously only in a secondary stage, when the mentioned associative play is sufficiently established and can be reproduced at will. " (Albert Einstein, [letter to Hadamard, in (Jacques Hadamard, "The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field, 1945)])
"Concepts are inventions of the human mind used to construct a model of the world. They package reality into discrete units for further processing, they support powerful mechanisms for doing logic, and they are indispensable for precise, extended chains of reasoning. […] A mental model is a cognitive construct that describes a person's understanding of a particular content domain in the world." (John Sown, "Conceptual Structures: Information Processing in Mind and Machine", 1984)
"How can we dare to predict the behavior of man? We may predict the movements of a machine, of an automaton; more than this, we many even try to predict the mechanisms or 'dynamisms' of the human psyche as well. But man is more than psyche." (Viktor Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning", 1984)
"Mental models are the mechanisms whereby humans are able to generate descriptions of system purpose and form, explanations of system functioning and observed system states, and predictions of future system states." (William B Rouse & Nancy M Morris, "On looking into the black box: Prospects and limits in the search for mental models", Psychological Bulletin (3), 1986)
"Model is used as a theory. It becomes theory when the purpose of building a model is to understand the mechanisms involved in the developmental process. Hence as theory, model does not carve up or change the world, but it explains how change takes place and in what way or manner. This leads to build change in the structures." (Laxmi K Patnaik, "Model Building in Political Science", The Indian Journal of Political Science Vol. 50 (2), 1989)
"[…] semantic nets fail to be distinctive in the way they (1) represent propositions, (2) cluster information for access, (3) handle property inheritance, and (4) handle general inference; in other words, they lack distinctive representational properties (i.e., 1) and distinctive computational properties (i.e., 2-4). Certain propagation mechanisms, notably 'spreading activation', 'intersection search', or 'inference propagation' have sometimes been regarded as earmarks of semantic nets, but since most extant semantic nets lack such mechanisms, they cannot be considered criterial in current usage." (Lenhart K Schubert, "Semantic Nets are in the Eye of the Beholder", 1990)
"What it means for a mental model to be a structural analog is that it embodies a representation of the spatial and temporal relations among, and the causal structures connecting the events and entities depicted and whatever other information that is relevant to the problem-solving talks. […] The essential points are that a mental model can be nonlinguistic in form and the mental mechanisms are such that they can satisfy the model-building and simulative constraints necessary for the activity of mental modeling." (Nancy J Nersessian, "Model-based reasoning in conceptual change", 1999)
"Models of bounded rationality describe how a judgement or decision is reached (that is, the heuristic processes or proximal mechanisms) rather than merely the outcome of the decision, and they describe the class of environments in which these heuristics will succeed or fail." (Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten [Eds., "Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox", 2001)
"A model isolates one or a few causal connections, mechanisms, or processes, to the exclusion of other contributing or interfering factors - while in the actual world, those other factors make their effects felt in what actually happens. Models may seem true in the abstract, and are false in the concrete. The key issue is about whether there is a bridge between the two, the abstract and the concrete, such that a simple model can be relied on as a source of relevantly truthful information about the complex reality." (Uskali Mäki,"Fact and Fiction in Economics: Models, Realism and Social Construction", 2002)
"We must begin by distinguishing between visual mental imagery and visual perception: Visual perception occurs while a stimulus is being viewed, and includes functions such as visual recognition (i. e., registering that a stimulus is familiar) and identification (i. e., recalling the name, context, or other information associated with the object). Two types of mechanisms are used in visual perception: ‘bottom-up’ mechanisms are driven by the input from the eyes; in contrast, ‘top-down’ mechanisms make use of stored information (such as knowledge, belief, expectations, and goals). Visual mental imagery is a set of representations that gives rise to the experience of viewing a stimulus in the absence of appropriate sensory input. In this case, information in memory underlies the internal events that produce the experience. Unlike afterimages, mental images are relatively prolonged." (Stephen M Kosslyn, "Mental images and the brain", Cognitive Neuropsychology 22, 2005)
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