Web x.0: From Einstein to Web's Challenges

I read yesterday a short humorous biography of Einstein [1] and, even if relatively well-written, combining some facts from Einstein’s life with a few comical exaggerations and wordplays, in the end it left a sour taste. When put in a broader context, the respective piece adds to the volume of false information available on the Web. Therefore, I felt the need to share with you a few personal observations made during the past decade.

The average Web user seems to be more interested in being entertained than learning interesting facts or information. This seems to be reflected also in the material shared on the social medias – a silly cat, dog or situation have the potential of bringing more likes than a well-written piece of fiction or non-fiction, and this by several factors of magnitude. On one side, this reflects the needs for shorter pieces of “useful” content, while on the other side, it kind of reflects the superficiality of the average consumer, superficiality sometimes understandable though.

It’s also true that for a writer it’s easier to exploit some superficial facts, especially when they can become good material for a piece of work. Digging for the truth or truthful content takes time and quite an effort, considering the number of sources that need to be consulted and the information that needs to be extracted, aggregated and put to good use. To make the truth or information understandable by the average reader, the writer needs to find the right words, ideas, metaphors and representational forms.

It’s much easier to denigrate or joke about than constructing something meaningful, than building a piece of work that can make a difference. Unfortunately, the quality of the information available on the Web decreased during the past years and it became more and more difficult to find useful and reliable content. Of course, I find it good that people attempt expressing their creativity and sharing their knowledge, however lot of the content is poorly written and questionable.

Sometimes fiction, especially through its comical and story-like character, has more power to be outspread over the social media, enlarging the volume of myths or half-truths available on the Web. Even if human can still in theory differentiate between fictitious content and facts, for machines it will be difficult to bridge the gap. The greater the gap between the two the higher the risk of the gap having a bigger impact on the information and knowledge repository consumed by our society.

Unfortunately, the social networks and their characteristics started to be exploited for various purposes, purposes sometimes found at the border of morality. The social platforms seem to be disinterested in answering timely to behavior that has the potential to be dangerous, and typically react late, sometimes even too late, when the respective behavior became already a problem. When not treated timely, it will become more difficult to countermeasure the effects the respective problems have directly or indirectly on our lives.

The problem resides not only with the social platforms but also with the organizations responsible for monitoring and addressing the flagrant deviations from common-sense. Sure, it’s understandable that some policies take time, especially when are considered the political, economic and social aspects – aspects reflected also in the complex relations existing between these areas and the various ecologies existing within. It’s maybe difficult to define policies that don’t trench upon individual’s freedom of expression, however a way must be found – otherwise the problems will widespread and impact our society considerable.

The next decade will bring its challenges and opportunities – from a spectator’s perspective it will be interesting to watch and ponder.

References:
[1] New Yorker (2019) Einstein: The Untold Story, by Hart Pomerantz [Online] Available from: https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/01/06/einstein-the-untold-story/amp

Knowledge Representation: On Metaphor (Quotes)

“Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy.” (Aristotle, “Poetics”, cca. 335 BC)

"Metaphors do somehow make known what they mean by the comparison they involve. Whenever we use them, we transfer meaning according to some similarity. But statements such as the aforesaid do not make anything known. There is no inherent resemblance to justify calling law ‘a measure’ or ‘an image’ , nor is it customary to refer to it as such. If one says that law is literally ‘a measure’ or ‘an 

image’, he is either deceiving or being deceived. An image is something fashioned in the likeness of something else, but such is not an inherent characteristic of law. If, on the other hand, the statement is not made in a literal sense, it is evident that it is obscure, and worse than any metaphorical expression." (Aristotle)

"The greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others; it is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars." (Aristotle, "Poetics", cca. 335 BC)

"The employment of tropes, just as the use of schemata, is the exclusive privilege of the very learned. The rules governing tropes are also very strict, so that the latitude in which they may be used is definitely limited. For the rules teach that we may not extend figures. One who is studiously imitating the authors by using metaphors and figures, must take care to avoid crude figures that are hard to interpret. What is primarily desirable in language is lucid clarity and easy comprehensibility. Therefore schemata should be used only out of necessity or for ornamentation. Speech was invented as a means of communicating mental concepts; and figures [of speech] are admitted so far as they compensate by their utility for whatever they lack in conformity to the [rules of the grammatical] art." (John of Salisbury, "Metalogicon", 1159)

"Metaphor [...] may be said to be the algebra of language." (Charles C Colton, “Lacon”, 1820)

“The drive toward the formation of metaphors is the fundamental human drive, which one cannot for a single instant dispense with in thought, for one would thereby dispense with man himself.” (Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense”, 1873)

“The folly of mistaking a paradox for a discovery, a metaphor for a proof, a torrent of verbiage for a spring of capital truths, and oneself for an oracle, is inborn in us.” (Paul Valéry, “Introduction to the Method of Leonardo da Vinci”, 1895)

"Progress in truth - truth of science and truth of religion - is mainly a progress in the framing of concepts, in discarding artificial abstractions or partial metaphors, and in evolving notions which strike more deeply into the root of reality." (Alfred N Whitehead, "Religion in the Making", 1926)

"Mathematical research can lend its organisational characteristics to poetry, whereby disjointed metaphors take on a universal sense. Similarly, the axiomatic foundations of group theory can be assimilated into a larger moral concept of a unified universe. Without this, mathematics would be a laborious Barbary." (Dan Barbilian, “The Autobiography of the Scientist”, 1940)

"[…] the major mathematical research acquires an organization and orientation similar to the poetical function which, adjusting by means of metaphor disjunctive elements, displays a structure identical to the sensitive universe. Similarly, by means of its axiomatic or theoretical foundation, mathematics assimilates various doctrines and serves the instructive purpose, the one set up by the unifying moral universe of concepts. " (Dan Barbilian, "The Autobiography of the Scientist", 1940)

“At the final stage you teach me that this wondrous and multicolored universe can be reduced to the atom and that the atom itself can be reduced to the electron. All this is good and I wait for you to continue. But you tell me of an invisible planetary system in which electrons gravitate around a nucleus. You explain this world to me with an image. I realize then that you have been reduced to poetry: I shall never know. Have I the time to become indignant? You have already changed theories. So that science that was to teach me everything ends up in a hypothesis, that lucidity founders in metaphor, that uncertainty is resolved in a work of art.” (Albert Camus, “The Myth of Sisyphus”, 1942)

“A metaphor holds a truth and an untruth, felt as inextricably bound up with each other. If one takes it as it is and gives it some sensual form, in the shape of reality, one gets dreams and art; but between these two and real, full-scale life there is a glass partition. If one analyzes it for its rational content and separates the unverifiable from the verifiable, one gets truth and knowledge but kills the feeling.” (Robert Musil, “Man Without Qualities”, 1943)

"A man desiring to understand the world looks about for a clue to its comprehension. He pitches upon some area of commonsense fact and tries to understand other areas in terms of this one. The original area becomes his basic analogy or root metaphor." (Stephen Pepper, "World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence", 1948)

"[…] theoretical science is essentially disciplined exploitation of metaphor." (Anatol Rapoport, "Operational Philosophy", 1953)

"Scientific metaphors are called models. They are made with the full knowledge that the connection between the metaphor and the real thing is primarily in the mind of the scientist. And they are made with a clearly definable purpose - as starting points of a deductive process. […] Like every other aspect of scientific procedure, the scientific metaphor is a pragmatic device, to be used freely as long as it serves its purpose, to be discarded without regrets when it fails to do so." (Anatol Rapoport, "Operational Philosophy", 1954) 

“Speaking without metaphor we have to declare that we are here faced with one of these typical antinomies caused by the fact that we have not yet succeeded in elaborating a fairly understandable outlook on the world without retiring our own mind, the producer of the world picture, from it, so that mind has no place in it. The attempt to press it into it, after all, necessarily produces some absurdities.” (Erwin Schrödinger, „Mind and Matter: the Tarner Lectures”, 1956)

"The symbol and the metaphor are as necessary to science as to poetry." (Jacob Bronowski, "Science and Human Values", 1956)

“We are always looking for metaphors in which to express our ideas of life, for our language is inadequate for all its complexities. Life is a labyrinth […]. Life is a machine […]. Life is a laboratory […]. It is but a metaphor. When we speak of ultimate things we can, maybe, speak only in metaphors.” (Charles Singer, “A Short History of Scientific Ideas to 1900”, 1959) 

"Every metaphor is the tip of a submerged model. […] Use of theoretical models resembles the use of metaphors in requiring analogical transfer of a vocabulary. Metaphor and model-making reveal new relationships; both are attempts to pour new content into old bottles." (Max Black," Models and Metaphors", 1962)

"[Metaphor] is a loose word, at best, and we must beware of attributing to it stricter rules of usage than are usually found in practice." (Max Black, “Models and Metaphors”, 1962)

"Rationality consists [of] the continuous adaptation of our language to our continually expanding world, and metaphor is one of the chief means by which this is accomplished." (Mary B Hesse, "Models and Analogies in Science", 1966)

"[...] one cannot describe reality; only give metaphors that indicate it. All human modes of description (photographic, mathematical, and literary) are metaphorical. Even the most precise scientific description of an object or movement is a tissue of metaphors." (John Fowles, “'Notes on an Unfinished Novel”, 1969)

"Science advances metaphorically. It does not proceed in an orthogenic fashion moving inexorably forward in a straight line. It does not radiate along many branches like a growing tree. It moves from one view to another by a large leap, preceded by a radical shift in the scientist’s mode of thought." (François Jacob, "The Logic of Life: A History of Heredity", 1970)

"But metaphor is an indispensable tool of thought and expression - a characteristic of all human communication, even of that of the scientist. The conceptual models of cybernetics and the energy theories of psycho-analysis are, after all, only labeled metaphors." (Gregory Bateson, "Steps to an Ecology of Mind", 1972) 

“A metaphor is a word used in an unfamiliar context to give us a new insight; a good metaphor moves us to see our ordinary world in an extraordinary way.” (Sallie McFague, “Speaking in Parables”, 1975)

"The very nature of science is such that scientists need the metaphor as a bridge between old and new theories." (Earl R MacCormac, "Metaphor and Myth in Science and Religion", 1976)

"Catastrophe Theory is-quite likely-the first coherent attempt (since Aristotelian logic) to give a theory on analogy. When narrow-minded scientists object to Catastrophe Theory that it gives no more than analogies, or metaphors, they do not realise that they are stating the proper aim of Catastrophe Theory, which is to classify all possible types of analogous situations." (René F Thom," La Théorie des catastrophes: État présent et perspective", 1977)

“[…] the use of analogies, particularly with metaphor, adds richness and dimension to arguments and descriptions not possible with ordinary discourse or with propositional reasoning.” (Jeanette M Gallagher, “The Future of Formal Thought Research: The Study of Analogy and Metaphor”, 1978)

"Clever metaphors die hard. Their tenacity of life approaches that of the hardiest micro-organisms. Living relics litter our language, their raisons d’etre forever past, ignored if not forgotten, and their present fascination seldom impaired by the confusions they may create." (James R Moore, "The Post-Darwinian Controversies", 1979)

"One should employ a metaphor in science only when there is good evidence that an important similarity or analogy exists between its primary and secondary subjects. One should seek to discover more about the relevant similarities or analogies, always considering the possibility that there are no important similarities or analogies, or alternatively, that there are quite distinct similarities for which distinct terminology should be introduced. One should try to discover what the 'essential' features of the similarities or analogies are, and one should try to assimilate one’s account of them to other theoretical work in the same subject area - that is, one should attempt to explicate the metaphor." (Richard Boyd, "Metaphor and Theory Change: What Is ‘Metaphor’ a Metaphor For?", 1979)

"The use of metaphor is one of many devices available to the scientific community to accomplish the task of accommodation of language to the causal structure of the world." (Richard Boyd, "Metaphor and theory change: what is ‘metaphor’ a metaphor for?", 1979)

"Metaphor is for most people a device of the poetic imagination and the rhetorical flourish - a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary language. Moreover, metaphor is typieully viewed as characteristic of language alone, a matter of words rather than thought or action. For this reason, most people think they can get along perfectly well without metaphor. We have found, on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature." (George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, "Metaphors we Live by", 1980)

"New metaphors are capable of creating new understandings and, therefore, new realities. This should be obvious in the case of poetic metaphor, where language is the medium through which new conceptual metaphors are created.” (George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, "Metaphors We Live By", 1980)

"The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another. […] Metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.” (George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 1980)

“Analogies, metaphors, and emblems are the threads by which the mind holds on to the world even when, absentmindedly, it has lost direct contact with it, and they guarantee the unity of human experience. Moreover, in the thinking process itself they serve as models to give us our bearings lest we stagger blindly among experiences that our bodily senses with their relative certainty of knowledge cannot guide us through.” (Hannah Arendt, “The Life of the Mind”, 1981)

"Metaphors deny distinctions between things: problems often arise from taking structural metaphors too literally. Because unexamined metaphors lead us to assume the identity of unidentical things, conflicts can arise which can only be resolved by understanding the metaphor (which requires its recognition as such), which means reconstructing the analogy on which it is based. […] The unexplained extension of concepts can too often result in the destruction rather than the expansion of meaning." (David Pimm,"Metaphor and Analogy in Mathematics", For the Learning of Mathematics Vol. 1 (3), 1981)

"Metaphor and simile are the characteristic tropes of scientific thought, not formal validity of argument." (Rom Harré, "Varieties of Realism", 1986)

“All great theories are expansive, and all notions so rich in scope and implication are underpinned by visions about the nature of things. You may call these visions ‘philosophy’, or ‘metaphor’, or ‘organizing principle’, but one thing they are surely not – they are not simple inductions from observed facts of the natural world.” (Stephen Jay Gould, “Time’s Arrow, Time’s Cycle”, 1987)

"Metaphor [is] a pervasive mode of understanding by which we project patterns from one domain of experience in order to structure another domain of a different kind. So conceived metaphor is not merely a linguistic mode of expression; rather, it is one of the chief cognitive structures by which we are able to have coherent, ordered experiences that we can reason about and make sense of. Through metaphor, we make use of patterns that obtain in our physical experience to organise our more abstract understanding. “ (Mark Johnson, “The Body in the Mind”, 1987)

"The model is only a suggestive metaphor, a fiction about the messy and unwieldy observations of the real world. In order for it to be persuasive, to convey a sense of credibility, it is important that it not be too complicated and that the assumptions that are made be clearly in evidence. In short, the model must be simple, transparent, and verifiable." (Edward Beltrami, "Mathematics for Dynamic Modeling", 1987)

"[…] mathematics does not come to us written indelibly on Nature’s Tablets, but rather is the product of a controlled search governed by metaphorical considerations, the premier instance being the heuristics of the conservation principles." (Philip Mirowski, "More Heat than Light: Economics as Social Physics: Physics as Nature’s Economics", 1989)

“The metaphor never goes very far, anymore than a curve can long be confused with its tangent.” (Henri Bergson, “A World of Ideas”, 1989)

"Today’s quarks and leptons can be viewed as metaphors of the underlying reality of nature, though metaphors that are objectively and rationally defied and are components of theories that have great predictive power. And that’s the difference between the metaphors of science and those of myth: scientific metaphors work." (Victor J Stenger, "Physics and Psychics: The Search for a World Beyond the Senses", 1990)

“[metaphors] are always open to more than one interpretation. But far from being a defect this essential openness is the reason why a number of those metaphors have had a very long life and have been able to survive great changes both in science and in the social background against which they first appeared.” (Olaf Pedersen, “The Book of Nature”, 1992)

"Metaphor plays an essential role in establishing a link between scientific language and the world. Those links are not, however, given once and for all. Theory change, in particular, is accompanied by a change in some of the relevant metaphors and in the corresponding parts of the network of similarities through which terms attach to nature." (Thomas S Kuhn, "Metaphor in science", 1993)

“People have amazing facilities for sensing something without knowing where it comes from (intuition); for sensing that some phenomenon or situation or object is like something else (association); and for building and testing connections and comparisons, holding two things in mind at the same time (metaphor). These facilities are quite important for mathematics. Personally, I put a lot of effort into ‘listening’ to my intuitions and associations, and building them into metaphors and connections. This involves a kind of simultaneous quieting and focusing of my mind. Words, logic, and detailed pictures rattling around can inhibit intuitions and associations.” (William P Thurston, “On proof and progress in mathematics”, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society Vol. 30 (2), 1994)

“A metaphor is not an ornament. It is an organ of perception. Through metaphors, we see the world as one thing or another.” (Neil Postman, “The End of Education: Redefining the Value of School”, 1996)

"If we are to have meaningful, connected experiences; ones that we can comprehend and reason about; we must be able to discern patterns to our actions, perceptions, and conceptions. Underlying our vast network of interrelated literal meanings (all of those words about objects and actions) are those imaginative structures of understanding such as schema and metaphor, such as the mental imagery that allows us to extrapolate a path, or zoom in on one part of the whole, or zoom out until the trees merge into a forest." (William H Calvin, "The Cerebral Code", 1996)

 “Metaphor, the life of language, can be the death of meaning. It should be used in moderation, like vodka. Writers drunk on metaphor can forget they are conveying information and ideas.” (Robert Fulford, 1996)

"The logic of the emotional mind is associative; it takes elements that symbolize a reality, or trigger a memory of it, to be the same as that reality. That is why similes, metaphors and images speak directly to the emotional mind." (Daniel Goleman, "Emotional Intelligence", 1996)

"Ideas about organization are always based on implicit images or metaphors that persuade us to see, understand, and manage situations in a particular way. Metaphors create insight. But they also distort. They have strengths. But they also have limitations. In creating ways of seeing, they create ways of not seeing. There can be no single theory or metaphor that gives an all-purpose point of view, and there can be no simple "correct theory" for structuring everything we do. The challenge facing modern managers is to become accomplished in the art of using metaphor to find new ways of seeing, understanding, and shaping their actions." (Gareth Morgan, ”Imaginization”, 1997)

"Metaphysics in philosophy is, of course, supposed to characterize what is real - literally real. The irony is that such a conception of the real depends upon unconscious metaphors." (George Lakoff,  "Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought", 1999)

“Metaphors can have profound significance because, as images or figures, they allow the mind to grasp or discover unsuspected ideal and material relationships between objects.” (Giuseppe Del Re, “Cosmic Dance”, 1999) 

"[…] philosophical theories are structured by conceptual metaphors that constrain which inferences can be drawn within that philosophical theory. The (typically unconscious) conceptual metaphors that are constitutive of a philosophical theory have the causal effect of constraining how you can reason within that philosophical framework." (George Lakoff, "Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to Western Thought", 1999)

“Metaphor is evidence of the human ability to visualize the universe as a coherent organism. Proof of our capacity, not just to see one thing in another but to change the very nature of things. When a metaphor is accepted as fact, it enters groupthink, taking on an existence in the real world. [...] Metaphor is the default form of thought, providing many angles from which to literally 'see' the world." (Marcel Danesi, "Poetic Logic: The Role of Metaphor in Thought, Language, and Culture", 2004)

“Metaphorizing is a  manner of thinking, not a  property of thinking. It is a  capacity of thought, not its quality. It represents a mental operation by which a previously existing entity is described in the characteristics of another one on the basis of some similarity or by reasoning. When we say that something is (like) something else, we have already performed a mental operation. This operation includes elements such as comparison, paralleling and shaping of the new image by ignoring its less satisfactory traits in order that this image obtains an aesthetic value. By this process, for an instant we invent a device, which serves as the pole vault for the comparison’s jump. Once the jump is made the pole vault is removed. This device could be a lightning-speed logical syllogism, or a momentary created term, which successfully merges the traits of the compared objects.” (Ivan Mladenov, “Conceptualizing Metaphors: On Charles Peirce’s marginalia”, 2006)

"In order to understand how mathematics is applied to understanding of the real world it is convenient to subdivide it into the following three modes of functioning: model, theory, metaphor. A mathematical model describes a certain range of phenomena qualitatively or quantitatively. […] A (mathematical) metaphor, when it aspires to be a cognitive tool, postulates that some complex range of phenomena might be compared to a mathematical construction." (Yuri I Manin," Mathematics as Metaphor: Selected Essays of Yuri I. Manin" , 2007)

"Metaphor is a primary cognitive tool by which we make sense of the world." (Terry Marks-Tarlow, "Psyche's Veil: Psychotherapy, Fractals and Complexity", 2008)

"When the words are used without mental image or concrete objects, we label them as metaphor. […] While concepts are being internalised, language is not only appropriated but metaphorised." (Lynne Cameron, "Metaphor in the construction of a learning environment", 2008)

 “The relationship of math to the real world has been a conundrum for philosophers for centuries, but it is also an inspiration for poets. The patterns of mathematics inhabit a liminal space - they were initially derived from the natural world and yet seem to exist in a separate, self-contained system standing apart from that world. This makes them a source of potential metaphor: mapping back and forth between the world of personal experience and the world of mathematical patterns opens the door to novel connections.” (Alice Major, “Mapping from e to Metaphor”, 2018) 

Knowledge Representation: On Analogy (Quotes)

“Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy.” (Aristotle, “Poetics”, cca. 335 BC)

“When men are ignorant of the natural causes producing things, and cannot even explain them by analogy with similar things, they attribute their own nature to them.” (Giambattista Vico, “The New Science”, 1725)

"In order to supply the defects of experience, we will have recourse to the probable conjectures of analogy, conclusions which we will bequeath to our posterity to be ascertained by new observations, which, if we augur rightly, will serve to establish our theory and to carry it gradually nearer to absolute certainty." (Johann H Lambert, "The System of the World", 1800)

"Simplicity and precision ought to be the characteristics of a scientific nomenclature: words should signify things, or the analogies of things, and not opinions." (Sir Humphry Davy, Elements of Chemical Philosophy", 1812)

"The foundations of chemical philosophy are observation, experiment, and analogy. By observation, facts are distinctly and minutely impressed on the mind. By analogy, similar facts are connected. By experiment, new facts are discovered; and, in the progression of knowledge, observation, guided by analogy, lends to experiment, and analogy confirmed by experiment, becomes scientific truth." (Sir Humphry Davy, "Elements of Chemical Philosophy" Vol. 4, 1812)

"The most important questions of life are, for the most part, really only problems of probability. Strictly speaking one may even say that nearly all our knowledge is problematical; and in the small number of things which we are able to know with certainty, even in the mathematical sciences themselves, induction and analogy, the principal means for discovering truth, are based on probabilities, so that the entire system of human knowledge is connected with this theory." (Pierre-Simon Laplace, "Theorie Analytique des Probabilités", 1812)

"Induction, analogy, hypotheses founded upon facts and rectified continually by new observations, a happy tact given by nature and strengthened by numerous comparisons of its indications with experience, such are the principal means for arriving at truth." (Pierre-Simon Laplace, "A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities", 1814)

"One may even say, strictly speaking, that almost all our knowledge is only probable; and in the small number of things that we are able to know with certainty, in the mathematical sciences themselves, the principal means of arriving at the truth - induction and analogy - are based on probabilities, so that the whole system of human knowledge is tied up with the theory set out in this essay." (Pierre-Simon Laplace, "Philosophical Essay on Probabilities", 1814)

"The substitution of analogy for fact is the bane of chemical philosophy; the legitimate use of analogy is to connect facts together and to guide to new experiments." (Sir Humphry Davy, "Journal of Science and the Arts", 1816)

"Analogy, although it is not infallible, is yet that telescope of the mind by which it is marvellously assisted in the discovery of both physical and moral truth." (Charles C Colton, "Lacon", 1820)

"Mathematical analysis is as extensive as nature itself; it defines all perceptible relations, measures times, spaces, forces, temperatures; this difficult science is formed slowly, but it preserves every principle which it has once acquired; it grows and strengthens itself incessantly in the midst of the many variations and errors of the human mind. It's chief attribute is clearness; it has no marks to express confused notations. It brings together phenomena the most diverse, and discovers the hidden analogies which unite them." (J B Joseph Fourier, "The Analytical Theory of Heat", 1822)


"It is true that of far the greater part of things, we must content ourselves with such knowledge as description may exhibit, or analogy supply; but it is true likewise, that these ideas are always incomplete, and that at least, till we have compared them with realities, we do not know them to be just. As we see more, we become possessed of more certainties, and consequently gain more principles of reasoning, and found a wider base of analogy." (Samuel Johnson, 1825)

"Such is the tendency of the human mind to speculation, that on the least idea of an analogy between a few phenomena, it leaps forward, as it were, to a cause or law, to the temporary neglect of all the rest; so that, in fact, almost all our principal inductions must be regarded as a series of ascents and descents, and of conclusions from a few cases, verified by trial on many." (Sir John Herschel, "A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy" , 1830) 

"Whilst chemical pursuits exalt the understanding, they do not depress the imagination or weaken genuine feeling; whilst they give the mind habits of accuracy, by obliging it to attend to facts, they likewise extend its analogies; and, though conversant with the minute forms of things, they have for their ultimate end the great and magnificent objects of nature." (Sir Humphry Davy, "Consolations in Travel, or the Last Days of a Philosopher", 1830)

"Science is nothing but the finding of analogy, identity, in the most remote parts." (Ralph W Emerson, 1837)

"It is frequently analogy which guides the experienced to what are called good guesses." (Francis W Newman, "Lectures on Logic", 1838)

"On the whole, Analogy is to be regarded as a step towards satisfactory proof, much in advance of first presumptions, if skillfully applied; though if the excessive vagueness of the word like be not checked, arguments from analogy may be of the wildest and silliest kind." (Francis W Newman, "Lectures on Logic", 1838)

"To reason from analogy is often dangerous, but to illustrate by a fanciful analogy is sometimes a means by which we light an idea, as it were, into the understanding of another." (Anna B Jameson, "Studies, Stories, and Memoirs", 1838)

“The invention of what we may call primary or fundamental notation has been but little indebted to analogy, evidently owing to the small extent of ideas in which comparison can be made useful. But at the same time analogy should be attended to, even if for no other reason than that, by making the invention of notation an art, the exertion of individual caprice ceases to be allowable. Nothing is more easy than the invention of notation, and nothing of worse example and consequence than the confusion of mathematical expressions by unknown symbols. If new notation be advisable, permanently or temporarily, it should carry with it some mark of distinction from that which is already in use, unless it be a demonstrable extension of the latter.” (Augustus De Morgan, “Calculus of Functions” Encyclopaedia of Pure Mathematics, 1847) 

"All perception of truth is the detection of an analogy [...]" (Henry D Thoreau, 1851)

"Reasoning from analogy is often most plausible and most deceptive." (Charles Simmons, "A Laconic Manual and Brief Remarker", 1852)

"Now there are subjects upon which the most sober and practical minds cannot help speculating a little beyond what they know. Sure and great results - yet familiar and common  and procured at will and by certain means, but in an unaccountable manner - naturally set us thinking and forming notion: how they come to pas ; and then it is safest and best to fill up the gaps of our knowledge from analogy." (Peter M Latham, "General Remarks on the Practice of Medicine", 1861)

"Induction and analogy are the special characteristics of modern mathematics, in which theorems have given place to theories and no truth is regarded otherwise than as a link in an infinite chain." (James J Sylvester, "A Plea for the Mathematician", Nature Vol. 1, 1870)

"[…] the world is full of hopeful analogies and handsome dubious eggs called possibilities.” (Mary A E Cross [George Eliot], “Middlemarch”, 1872)

"It would be an error to suppose that the great discoverer seizes at once upon the truth, or has any unerring method of divining it. In all probability the errors of the great mind exceed in number those of the less vigorous one. Fertility of imagination and abundance of guesses at truth are among the first requisites of discovery; but the erroneous guesses must be many times as numerous as those that prove well founded. The weakest analogies, the most whimsical notations, the most apparently absurd theories, may pass through the teeming brain, and no record remain of more than the hundredth part." (William S Jevons, "The Principles of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method", 1874)

"Summing up, then, it would seem as if the mind of the great discoverer must combine contradictory attributes. He must be fertile in theories and hypotheses, and yet full of facts and precise results of experience. He must entertain the feeblest analogies, and the merest guesses at truth, and yet he must hold them as worthless till they are verified in experiment. When there are any grounds of probability he must hold tenaciously to an old opinion, and yet he must be prepared at any moment to relinquish it when a clearly contradictory fact is encountered." (William S Jevons, "The Principles of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method", 1874)

"If one looks at the different problems of the integral calculus which arise naturally when he wishes to go deep into the different parts of physics, it is impossible not to be struck by the analogies existing. Whether it be electrostatics or electrodynamics, the propagation of heat, optics, elasticity, or hydrodynamics, we are led always to differential equations of the same family." (Henri Poincaré, "Sur les Equations aux Dérivées Partielles de la Physique Mathématique", American Journal of Mathematics Vol. 12, 1890)

"Most surprising and far-reaching analogies revealed themselves between apparently quite disparate natural processes. It seemed that nature had built the most various things on exactly the same pattern; or, in the dry words of the analyst, the same differential equations hold for the most various phenomena. (Ludwig Boltzmann, "On the methods of theoretical physics", 1892)

"How awkward is the human mind in divining the nature of things, when forsaken by the analogy of what we see and touch directly?" (Ludwig Boltzmann, Certain Questions of the Theory of Gasses", Nature Vol. 51 (1322), 1895)

"If men of science owe anything to us, we may learn much from them that is essential. For they can show how to test proof, how to secure fulness and soundness in induction, how to restrain and to employ with safety hypothesis and analogy." (Lord John Acton, [Lecture] "The Study of History", 1895)

"Mathematical science is in my opinion an indivisible whole, an organism whose vitality is conditioned upon the connection of its parts. For with all the variety of mathematical knowledge, we are still clearly conscious of the similarity of the logical devices, the relationship of the ideas in mathematics as a whole and the numerous analogies in its different departments." (David Hilbert," Mathematical Problems", Bulletin American Mathematical Society Vol. 8, 1901-1902)

"Analogies are figures intended to serve as fatal weapons if they succeed, and as innocent toys if they fail." (Henry Adams, "Mont Saint Michel and Chartres", 1904)

"So is not mathematical analysis then not just a vain game of the mind? To the physicist it can only give a convenient language; but isn't that a mediocre service, which after all we could have done without; and, it is not even to be feared that this artificial language be a veil, interposed between reality and the physicist's eye? Far from that, without this language most of the initimate analogies of things would forever have remained unknown to us; and we would never have had knowledge of the internal harmony of the world, which is, as we shall see, the only true objective reality." (Henri Poincaré, "The Value of Science", 1905)

"Without this language [mathematics] most of the intimate analogies of things would have remained forever unknown to us; and we should forever have been ignorant of the internal harmony of the world, which is the only true objective reality." (Henri Poincaré," The Value of Science", Popular Science Monthly, 1906) 

"The existence of analogies between central features of various theories implies the existence of a general theory which underlies the particular theories and unifies them with respect to those central features." (Eliakim H Moore, "Introduction to a Form of General Analysis", 1910)

"The mathematical facts worthy of being studied are those which, by their analogy with other facts, are capable of leading us to the knowledge of a physical law. They reveal the kinship between other facts, long known, but wrongly believed to be strangers to one another." (Henri Poincaré, 1913)

“It must be gently but firmly pointed out that analogy is the very corner-stone of scientific method. A root-and-branch condemnation would invalidate any attempt to explain the unknown in terms of the known, and thus prune away every hypothesis.” (Archie E Heath, “On Analogy”, The Cambridge Magazine, 1918) 

"[…] analogies are not ‘aids’ to the establishment of theories; they are an utterly essential part of theories, without which theories would be completely valueless and unworthy of the name. It is often suggested that the analogy leads to the formulation of the theory, but that once the theory is formulated the analogy has served its purpose and may be removed or forgotten. Such a suggestion is absolutely false and perniciously misleading." (Norman R Campbell, "Physics: The Elements", 1920)

"To regard analogy as an aid to the invention of theories is as absurd as to regard melody as an aid to the composition of sonatas." (Norman R Campbell, "Physics: The Elements", 1920)

"Analogies prove nothing, that is quite true, but they can make one feel more at home." (Sigmund Freud, Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse" ["New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis"], 1933)

"If the scientist has, during the whole of his life, observed carefully, trained himself to be on the look-out for analogy and possessed himself of relevant knowledge, then the ‘instrument of feeling’ […] will become a powerful divining rod leading the scientist to discover order in the midst of chaos by providing him with a clue, a hint, or an hypothesis upon which to base his experiments." (Rosamund E M Harding, "An Anatomy of Inspiration", 1940)

"The question of the origin of the hypothesis belongs to a domain in which no very general rules can be given; experiment, analogy and constructive intuition play their part here. But once the correct hypothesis is formulated, the principle of mathematical induction is often sufficient to provide the proof." (Richard Courant & Herbert Robbins, "What Is Mathematics?: An Elementary Approach to Ideas and Methods" , 1941) 

"Analogies are useful for analysis in unexplored fields. By means of analogies an unfamiliar system may be compared with one that is better known. The relations and actions are more easily visualized, the mathematics more readily applied, and the analytical solutions more readily obtained in the familiar system." (Harry F Olson, "Dynamical Analogies", 1943)

"Of course we have still to face the question why these analogies between different mechanisms - these similarities of relation-structure - should exist. To see common principles and simple rules running through such complexity is at first perplexing though intriguing. When, however, we find that the apparently complex objects around us are combinations of a few almost indestructible units, such as electrons, it becomes less perplexing." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"This, however, is very speculative; the point of interest for our present enquiry is that physical reality is built up, apparently, from a few fundamental types of units whose properties determine many of the properties of the most complicated phenomena, and this seems to afford a sufficient explanation of the emergence of analogies between mechanisms and similarities of relation-structure among these combinations without the necessity of any theory of objective universals." (Kenneth Craik, "The Nature of Explanation", 1943)

"Analogy pervades all our thinking, our everyday speech and our trivial conclusions as well as artistic ways of expression and the highest scientific achievements." (George Pólya, "How to Solve It", 1945)

"[…] the number of available analogies is a determining factor in the growth and progress of science." (Morris R Cohen, "The Meaning of Human History", 1947)

"A man desiring to understand the world looks about for a clue to its comprehension. He pitches upon some area of commonsense fact and tries to understand other areas in terms of this one. The original area becomes his basic analogy or root metaphor." (Stephen Pepper, "World Hypotheses: A Study in Evidence", 1948)

"The solution of the difficulty is that the two mental pictures which experiment lead us to form - the one of the particles, the other of the waves - are both incomplete and have only the validity of analogies which are accurate only in limiting cases." (Werner Heisenberg, "The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory", 1949)

"There is always an analogy between nature and the imagination, and possibly poetry is merely the strange rhetoric of that parallel." (Wallace Stevens, "The Necessary Angel", 1951)

"An analogy is not a reason […]" (Hardy Cross, "Engineers and Ivory Towers", 1952)

"[…] one of the main functions of an analogy or model is to suggest extensions of the theory by considering extensions of the analogy, since more is known about the analogy than is known about the subject matter of the theory itself [...]" (Mary B Hesse, "Operational Definition and Analogy in Physical Theories", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2 (8), 1952)

"We cannot define truth in science until we move from fact to law. And within the body of laws in turn, what impresses us as truth is the orderly coherence of the pieces. They fit together like the characters of a great novel, or like the words of a poem. Indeed, we should keep that last analogy by us always, for science is a language, and like a language it defines its parts by the way they make up a meaning. Every word in a sentence has some uncertainty of definition, and yet the sentence defines its own meaning and that of its words conclusively. It is the internal unity and coherence of science which gives it truth, and which makes it a better system of prediction than any less orderly language." (Jacob Bronowski, "The Common Sense of Science", 1953)

"The methods of science may be described as the discovery of laws, the explanation of laws by theories, and the testing of theories by new observations. A good analogy is that of the jigsaw puzzle, for which the laws are the individual pieces, the theories local patterns suggested by a few pieces, and the tests the completion of these patterns with pieces previously unconsidered." (Edwin P Hubble, "The Nature of Science and Other Lectures", 1954)

"Analogy suggests rather than proves." (Edward Hodnett, "The Art of Problem Solving", 1955)

"In no subject is there a rule, compliance with which will lead to new knowledge or better understanding. Skillful observations, ingenious ideas, cunning tricks, daring suggestions, laborious calculations, all these may be required to advance a subject. Occasionally the conventional approach in a subject has to be studiously followed; on other occasions it has to be ruthlessly disregarded. Which of these methods, or in what order they should be employed is generally unpredictable. Analogies drawn from the history of science are frequently claimed to be a guide; but, as with forecasting the next game of roulette, the existence of the best analogy to the present is no guide whatever to the future. The most valuable lesson to be learnt from the history of scientific progress is how misleading and strangling such analogies have been, and how success has come to those who ignored them." (Thomas Gold," Cosmology", 1956) 

"As every mathematician knows, nothing is more fruitful than these obscure analogies, these indistinct reflections of one theory into another, these furtive caresses, these inexplicable disagreements; also nothing gives the researcher greater pleasure." (André Weil, "De la Métaphysique aux Mathématiques", 1960)

"Analogy is even slipperier than logic." (Robert A Heinlein, "Stranger in a Strange Land", 1961)

“Science fiction is, very strictly and literally, analogous to science facts. It is a convenient analog system for thinking about new scientific, social, and economic ideas - and for re-examining old ideas.” (John W Campbell Jr., “Prologue to Analog”, 1962)

"When a science approaches the frontiers of its knowledge, it seeks refuge in allegory or in analogy." (Erwin Chargaff, "Essays on Nucleic Acids", 1963)

"Analogy serves to provoke certain types of questions which can, on investigation, lead to the recognition of more comprehensive ranges of order in the archaeological data." (Lewis R Binford, "Smudge Pits and Hide Smoking: The Use of Analogy in Archaeological Reasoning, American Antiquity Vol. 32 (1), 1967)

"Everything lives by movement, everything is maintained by equilibrium, and harmony results from the analogy of contraries; this law is the form of forms." (Eliphas Levi, "Transcendental Magic", 1968)

"It is probably no exaggeration to say that all of theoretical physics proceeds by analogy." (Jeremy Bernstein, "Elementary Particles and Their Currents", 1968)

"More than a burial ground for unacceptable ideas and wishes, the unconscious is the spawning ground of intuition and insight, the source of humor, of poetic imagery, and of scientific analogy." (Judith Groch, "The Right to Create", 1969)

"An analogy is a relationship between two entities, processes, or what you will, which allows inferences to be made about one of the things, usually that about which we know least, on the basis of what we know about the other. […] The art of using analogy is to balance up what we know of the likenesses against the unlikenesses between two things, and then on the basis of this balance make an inference as to what is called the neutral analogy, that about which we do not know." (Rom Harré," The Philosophies of Science" , 1972) 

"Catastrophe Theory is-quite likely-the first coherent attempt (since Aristotelian logic) to give a theory on analogy. When narrow-minded scientists object to Catastrophe Theory that it gives no more than analogies, or metaphors, they do not realise that they are stating the proper aim of Catastrophe Theory, which is to classify all possible types of analogous situations." (René F Thom," La Théorie des catastrophes: État présent et perspective", 1977)

"The scientific discovery appears first as the hypothesis of an analogy; and science tends to become independent of the hypothesis." (William K Clifford, "Lectures and Essays", 1879)

"A mathematician’s work is mostly a tangle of guesswork, analogy, wishful thinking and frustration, and proof, far from being the core of discovery, is more often than not a way of making sure that our minds are not playing tricks." (Gian-Carlo Rota, 1981)

"[…] an analogy links a relationship A:B to another C:D. For example, old age is to one's life as the season of winter is to a year. While proportion is a symmetrical mathematical relation, the use of analogy customarily presumes a unidirectionality, assuming we know more about one relationship than the other. Hence by constructing this link we can thereby illuminate or evaluate the first relationship better. (Two-way flow is also possible: for example, the development of computers and knowledge of the brain: both currently feed off analogies and metaphors from the other.)" (David Pimm,"Metaphor and Analogy in Mathematics", For the Learning of Mathematics Vol. 1 (3), 1981)

"Analogies, metaphors, and emblems are the threads by which the mind holds on to the world even when, absentmindedly, it has lost direct contact with it, and they guarantee the unity of human experience. Moreover, in the thinking process itself they serve as models to give us our bearings lest we stagger blindly among experiences that our bodily senses with their relative certainty of knowledge cannot guide us through." (Hannah Arendt, "The Life of the Mind", 1981)

"Metaphors deny distinctions between things: problems often arise from taking structural metaphors too literally. Because unexamined metaphors lead us to assume the identity of unidentical things, conflicts can arise which can only be resolved by understanding the metaphor (which requires its recognition as such), which means reconstructing the analogy on which it is based. […] The unexplained extension of concepts can too often result in the destruction rather than the expansion of meaning." (David Pimm,"Metaphor and Analogy in Mathematics", For the Learning of Mathematics Vol. 1 (3), 1981)

"There are many things you can do with problems besides solving them. First you must define them, pose them. But then of course you can also refi ne them, depose them, or expose them or even dissolve them! A given problem may send you looking for analogies, and some of these may lead you astray, suggesting new and different problems, related or not to the original. Ends and means can get reversed. You had a goal, but the means you found didn’t lead to it, so you found a new goal they did lead to. It’s called play. Creative mathematicians play a lot; around any problem really interesting they develop a whole cluster of analogies, of playthings." (David Hawkins, "The Spirit of Play", Los Alamos Science, 1987)

"A scientific problem can be illuminated by the discovery of a profound analogy, and a mundane problem can be solved in a similar way." (Philip Johnson-Laird, "The Computer and the Mind", 1988)

"Mathematics is also seen by many as an analogy. But it is implicitly assumed to be the analogy that never breaks down. Our experience of the world has failed to reveal any physical phenomenon that cannot be described mathematically. That is not to say that there are not things for which such a description is wholly inappropriate or pointless. Rather, there has yet to be found any system in Nature so unusual that it cannot be fitted into one of the strait-jackets that mathematics provides." (John Barrow," Pi in the Sky: Counting, Thinking, and Being", 1992)

"Mathematics is the study of analogies between analogies. All science is. Scientists want to show that things that don’t look alike are really the same. That is one of their innermost Freudian motivations. In fact, that is what we mean by understanding." (Gian-Carlo Rota, "Indiscrete Thoughts", 1997)

“What cognitive capabilities underlie our fundamental human achievements? Although a complete answer remains elusive, one basic component is a special kind of symbolic activity - the ability to pick out patterns, to identify recurrences of these patterns despite variation in the elements that compose them, to form concepts that abstract and reify these patterns, and to express these concepts in language. Analogy, in its most general sense, is this ability to think about relational patterns.” (Keith Holyoak et al, “Introduction: The Place of Analogy in Cognition”, 2001)

"To criticize mathematics for its abstraction is to miss the point entirely. Abstraction is what makes mathematics work. If you concentrate too closely on too limited an application of a mathematical idea, you rob the mathematician of his most important tools: analogy, generality, and simplicity. Mathematics is the ultimate in technology transfer." (Ian Stewart, "Does God Play Dice: The New Mathematics of Chaos", 2002)

"Education is a set of analogies to a genuinely human existence, of which the arts are the model. Merely human life is of course a demonic analogy or parody of genuinely human life." (Northrop Frye, "Notebooks and Lectures on the Bible and Other Religious Texts", 2003)

“It makes no sense to seek a single best way to represent knowledge - because each particular form of expression also brings its particular limitations. For example, logic-based systems are very precise, but they make it hard to do reasoning with analogies. Similarly, statistical systems are useful for making predictions, but do not serve well to represent the reasons why those predictions are sometimes correct.” (Marvin Minsky, "The Emotion Machine: Commonsense Thinking, Artificial Intelligence, and the Future of the Human Mind", 2006)

"What could mathematics and poetry share, except that the mention of either one is sometimes enough to bring an uneasy chill into a conversation? [...] Both fields use analogies - comparisons of all sorts - to explain things, to express unknown or unknowable concepts, and to teach." (Marcia Birken & Anne C Coon, “Discovering Patterns in Mathematics and Poetry”, 2008)

"By bringing together what we know and what we don't know through analogy, metaphorical thinking strikes the spark that ignites discovery." (James Geary, [TED talk] 2009)

"The human mind delights in finding pattern - so much so that we often mistake coincidence or forced analogy for profound meaning. No other habit of thought lies so deeply within the soul of a small creature trying to make sense of a complex world not constructed for it." (Stephen J Gould, "The Flamingo's Smile: Reflections in Natural History", 2010)

Knowledge Representation: Mental Models’ Fallacies (Part II: The Self-Fulfilling Prophecies)

Mental Models Series

It’s in human nature to simplify the world around us, to identify patterns of behavior and to categorize further behavior based on the beliefs, perceived patterns and mental models we form. Furthermore, we tend to look for cues that accustom our believes, even if the cues aren’t there, and we find ourselves in the position of modifying the “reality” as it seems fit. The mental models we live by are powerful because they allow us identifying, explaining, handling and predicting situations we are confronted with almost in automatic modus. These models can prove to be useful in a range of situations, however their power has a double effect on us, as they can prove to be damaging for ourselves as well for the others.

As Thomas Jefferson remarked “the moment a person forms a theory [or mental model], his imagination sees, in every object, only the traits which favor that theory”. The mental models are used to filter the information around, and to reinforce the beliefs in respect to the formed models. We attempt to predict certain outcome and behavior, and, through our behavior and reasoning, we attempt to support the beliefs and facts behind the prediction, forcing the prediction to become true. It’s what is known metaphorically as a self-fulfilling prophecy, considering that a prediction can be considered as a prophecy and the person making the prediction kind of a prophet for his own world.

Wikipedia defines a self-fulfilling prophecy as “a prediction that directly or indirectly causes itself to become true, by the very terms of the prophecy itself, due to positive feedback between belief and behavior” [2]. According to Robert Merthon, the first who coined the concept, “the self-fulfilling prophecy is, in the beginning, a false definition of the situation evoking a new behavior which makes the original false conception come true” [1]. The false definition can result from false or incomplete information, false assumptions, wrong identification of the context, and in the end from the limitations of the available models.

Unfortunately, the people who suffer the most from this fallacy are not the originators but the people around, and this from the early years of their childhood, when based on certain misconceptions their capabilities are evaluated and reinforced on them. It starts with the parents and the people found in the extended circle of their family, by teachers and later by colleagues or managers. However, the most influential time is the one spent in school, where teachers’ perceptions and behavior determine to high degree students’ performance.

When a teacher repeatedly declares about a student that he’s stupid or makes similar statements with negative effect, the student will either start believing them, question teacher’s judgment and event attempt proving that the teacher is wrong. It's deplorable when no matter of student’s effort the teacher persists in his impression(s) and further supports them. - in time the student will accept the situation and in extremis will stop trying. Unfortunately, the educational setup favors such scenarios.

When the originators persist in their mistakes then the fallacy can impact their lives as well as their behavior can be recognized by others as unjust, discriminatory, immature, etc. Feedback can prove to be helpful to identify that one has a problem, though usually it comes late. One’s chance is to become aware of his presumptions, reasoning and mental models one brings forth into the world and the effect they have on other people. Through effort, awareness, adaptation of the models, and continuous feedback, one can escape this circle of misconceptions and this might pay off, because in the end we reap what we sow.

Previous Post <<||>> Next Post  

References:
[1] Robert K Merton (1948), "Self-Fulfilling Prophecy" , The Antioch Review Vol. 8 (2), [Online] Available from: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4609267
[2] Wikipedia (2018) Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, [Online] Available from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-fulfilling_prophecy

Knowledge Representation: On Concepts (Quotes)

"The analysis of concepts is for the understanding nothing more than what the magnifying glass is for sight." (Moses Mendelssohn, 1763)

"All human knowledge begins with intuitions, proceeds from thence to concepts, and ends with ideas." (Immanuel Kant, "Critique of Pure Reason", 1781)

"Our knowledge springs from two fundamental sources of the mind; the first is the capacity of receiving representations (receptivity for impressions), the second is the power of knowing an object through these representations (spontaneity [in the production] of concepts)." (Immanuel Kant, "Critique of Pure Reason", 1781)

"Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their unison can knowledge arise." (Immanuel Kant, "Critique of Pure Reason", 1781)

"It is impossible to disassociate language from science or science from language, because every natural science always involves three things: the sequence of phenomena on which the science is based; the abstract concepts which call these phenomena to mind; and the words in which the concepts are expressed. To call forth a concept a word is needed; to portray a phenomenon a concept is needed. All three mirror one and the same reality." (Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier, "Traite Elementaire de Chimie", 1789)

"We construct concepts when we represent them in intuition a priori, without experience, or when we represent in intuition  the object which corresponds to our concept of it. - The mathematician can never apply his reason to mere concepts, nor the philosopher to the construction of concepts. - In mathematics  the reason is employed in concreto, however, the intuition is not  empirical, but the object of contemplation is something a priori." (Immanuel Kant, "Logic", 1800)

"With the synthesis of every new concept in the aggregation of coordinate characteristics the extensive or complex distinctness is increased; with the further analysis of concepts in the series of subordinate characteristics the intensive or deep distinctness is increased. The latter kind of distinctness, as it necessarily serves the thoroughness and conclusiveness of cognition, is therefore mainly the business of philosophy and is carried farthest especially in metaphysical investigations." (Immanuel Kant, "Logic", 1800)

"Former ages thought in terms of images of the imagination, whereas we moderns have concepts. Formerly the guiding ideas of life presented themselves in concrete visual form as divinities, whereas today they are conceptualized. The ancients excelled in creation; our own strength lies rather in destruction, in analysis." (Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, 1806)

"The principle of contradiction establishes merely the agreement of concepts, but does not itself produce concepts." (Arthur Schopenhauer, "The World as Will and Representation", 1819)

"To repeat abstractly, universally, and distinctly in concepts the whole inner nature of the world, and thus to deposit it as a reflected image in permanent concepts always ready for the faculty of reason, this and nothing else is philosophy." (Arthur Schopenhauer, "The World as Will and Representation", 1819)

"Every word instantly becomes a concept precisely insofar as it is not supposed to serve as a reminder of the unique and entirely individual original experience to which it owes its origin; but rather, a word becomes a concept insofar as it simultaneously has to fit countless more or less similar cases - which means, purely and simply, cases which are never equal and thus altogether unequal. Every concept arises from the equation of unequal things. Just as it is certain that one leaf is never totally the same as another, so it is certain that the concept 'leaf' is formed by arbitrarily discarding these individual differences and by forgetting the distinguishing aspects." (Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense", 1873)

"Everything which distinguishes man from the animals depends upon this ability to volatilize perceptual metaphors in a schema, and thus to dissolve an image into a concept." (Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense", 1873)

"That immense framework and planking of concepts to which the needy man clings his whole life long in order to preserve himself is nothing but a scaffolding and toy for the most audacious feats of the liberated intellect. And when it smashes this framework to pieces, throws it into confusion, and puts it back together in an ironic fashion, pairing the most alien things and separating the closest, it is demonstrating that it has no need of these makeshifts of indigence and that it will now be guided by intuitions rather than by concepts. There is no regular path which leads from these intuitions into the land of ghostly schemata, the land of abstractions. There exists no word for these intuitions; when man sees them he grows dumb, or else he speaks only in forbidden metaphors and in unheard - of combinations of concepts. He does this so that by shattering and mocking the old conceptual barriers he may at least correspond creatively to the impression of the powerful present intuition." (Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense", 1873)

"One should not understand this compulsion to construct concepts, species, forms, purposes, laws ('a world of identical cases') as if they enabled us to fix the real world; but as a compulsion to arrange a world for ourselves in which our existence is made possible - we thereby create a world which is calculable, simplified, comprehensible, etc., for us." Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Will to Power", 1883-1888)

“There are three aspects of thinking as more or less complete stages of it. These are, conception, judgment, and reasoning. They are not to be considered three distinct acts; not even three successive stages. No one of them could occur without each of the others.” (John Dewey, “Psychology”, 1887)

"While science is pursuing a steady onward movement, it is convenient from time to time to cast a glance back on the route already traversed, and especially to consider the new conceptions which aim at discovering the general meaning of the stock of facts accumulated from day to day in our laboratories." (Dmitry Mendeleyev, "The Periodic Law of the Chemical Elements", Journal of the Chemical Society Vol. 55, 1889)

"The aim of ‘science’ is to attain conceptions so adequate and exact that we shall never need to change them." (William James, "The Principles of Psychology", 1890)

"Science like life feeds on its own decay. New facts burst old rules; then newly developed concepts bind old and new together into a reconciling law." (William James, "The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy", 1896)

"[In mathematics] we behold the conscious logical activity of the human mind in its purest and most perfect form. Here we learn to realize the laborious nature of the process, the great care with which it must proceed, the accuracy which is necessary to determine the exact extent of the general propositions arrived at, the difficulty of forming and comprehending abstract concepts; but here we learn also to place confidence in the certainty, scope and fruitfulness of such intellectual activity." (Hermann von Helmholtz, "Über das Verhältnis der Naturwissenschaften zur Gesammtheit der Wissenschaft", 1896)

"This is the greatest degree of impoverishment; the image, deprived little by little of its own characteristics, is nothing more than a shadow. It has become that transitional form between image and pure concept that we now term ‘generic image’, or one that at least resembles the latter. The image, then, is subject to an unending process of change, of suppression and addition, of dissociation and corrosion." (Théodule-Armand Ribot, "Essay on the Creative Imagination" , 1900)

"The relation of word to thought, and the creation of new concepts is a complex, delicate and enigmatic process unfolding in our soul." (Lev N Tolstoy, "Pedagogical Writings", 1903)

"But surely it is self-evident that every theory is merely a framework or scheme of concepts together with their necessary relations to one another, and that the basic elements can be constructed as one pleases." (Gottlob Frege, "On the Foundations of Geometry and Formal Theories of Arithmetic" , cca. 1903-1909)

"Mathematics, the science of the ideal, becomes the means of investigating, understanding and making known the world of the real. The complex is expressed in terms of the simple. From one point of view mathematics may be defined as the science of successive substitutions of simpler concepts for more complex." (Wiliam F. White, "A Scrap-book of Elementary Mathematics", 1908)

“Concepts have meaning only if we can point to objects to which they refer and to rules by which they are assigned to these objects.” (Albert Einstein, "Ernst Mach", Physikalische Zeitschrift 17, 1916)

"Science works by the slow method of the classification of data, arranging the detail patiently in a periodic system into groups of facts, in series like the strata of the rocks. For each series there must be a vocabulary of special words which do not always make good sense when used in another series. But the laws of periodicity seem to hold throughout, among the elements and in every sphere of thought, and we must learn to co-ordinate the whole through our new conception of the reign of relativity." (William H Pallister, "Poems of Science", 1931)

"The fundamental concepts of physical science, it is now understood, are abstractions, framed by our mind, so as to bring order to an apparent chaos of phenomena." (Sir William C Dampier, "A History of Science and its Relations with Philosophy & Religion", 1931)

"The distinguishing feature of modern scientific thought lies in the fact that it begins by discarding all a priori conceptions about the nature of reality - or about the ultimate nature of the universe - such as had characterized practically all Greek philosophy and all medieval thinking as well, and takes instead, as its starting point, well-authenticated, carefully tested experimental facts, no matter whether these facts seen at the moment to fit into any general philosophical scheme or not - that is, no matter whether they seem at the moment to be reasonable or not." (Robert A Millikan, "Professor Einstein at the California Institute of Technology", Science Vol. 73 (1893), 1931)

“Concepts can only acquire content when they are connected, however indirectly, with sensible experience. But no logical investigation can reveal this connection; it can only be experienced. […] this connection […] determines the cognitive value of systems of concepts.” (Albert Einstein, "The Problem of Space, Ether, and the Field in Physics", Mein Weltbild, 1934) 

"Physical concepts are free creations of the human mind, and are not, however it may seem, uniquely determined by the external world In our endeavor to understand reality we are somewhat like a man trying to understand the mechanism of a closed watch. He sees the face and the moving hands, even hears its ticking, but he has no way of opening the case. If he is ingenious he may form some picture of a mechanism which could be responsible for all the things he observes, but he may never be quite sure his picture is the only one which could explain his observations. He will never be able to compare his picture with the real mechanism and he cannot even imagine the possibility of the meaning of such a comparison."

"Thus, the object presents itself in the image as having to be apprehended in a multiplicity of synthetic acts. Due to this fact, and because its content retains a sensible opacity, like a phantom, because it does not involve either essences or generating laws but only an irrational quality, it gives the impression of being an object of observation: from this point of view the image appears to be more like a perception than a concept." (Jean-Paul Sartre, "The Psychology of Imagination", 1940)

"A useful concept may be a barrier to the acceptance of a better one if long-entrenched in the minds of scientists." (James B Conant, "On Understanding Science", 1947)

"A theory is the more impressive the greater the simplicity of its premises is, the more different kinds of things it relates, and the more extended is its area of applicability." (Albert Einstein, "Autobiographical Notes", 1949)

"What in fact is the schema of the object? In one essential respect it is a schema belonging to intelligence. To have the concept of an object is to attribute the perceived figure to a substantial basis, so that the figure and the substance that it thus indicates continue to exist outside the perceptual field. The permanence of the object seen from this viewpoint is not only a product of intelligence, but constitutes the very first of those fundamental ideas of conservation which we shall see developing within the thought process." (Jean Piaget, "The Psychology of Intelligence", 1950)

"In speaking here of ‘comprehensibility’, the expression is used in its most modest sense. It implies: the production being produced by the creation of general concepts, relations between these concepts and sense experience. It is in this sense that the world of our sense experiences is comprehensible. The fact that it is comprehensible is a miracle." (Albert Einstein, "Out of My Later Years", 1950)

"Physics too deals with mathematical concepts; however, these concepts attain physical content only by the clear determination of their relation to the objects of experience." (Albert Einstein, "Out of My Later Years", 1950)

"Science is still the versatile, unpredictable hero of the play, creating endless new situations, opening romantic vistas and challenging accepted concepts." (René J Dubos, "Louis Pasteur: Free Lance of Science", 1950)

"We have here no esoteric theory of the ultimate nature of concepts, nor a philosophical championing of the primacy of the 'operation'. We have merely a pragmatic matter, namely that we have observed after much experience that if we want to do certain kinds of things with our concepts, our concepts had better be constructed in certain ways. In fact one can see that the situation here is no different from what we always find when we push our analysis to the limit; operations are not ultimately sharp or irreducible any more than any other sort of creature. We always run into a haze eventually, and all our concepts are describable only in spiralling approximation." (Percy W. Bridgman, "Reflections of a Physicist", 1950)

"A conceptual scheme is never discarded merely because of a few stubborn facts with which it cannot be reconciled; a conceptual scheme is either modified or replaced by a better one, never abandoned with nothing left to take its place." (James B Conant, "Science and Common Sense", 1951)

"Science is an interconnected series of concepts and schemes that have developed as a result of experimentation and observation and are fruitful of further experimentation and observation."(James B Conant, "Science and Common Sense", 1951)

"A collection of observable concepts in a purely formal hypothesis suggesting no analogy with anything would consequently not suggest either any directions for its own development." (Mary B Hesse, "Operational Definition and Analogy in Physical Theories", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2 (8), 1952)

“Concepts are for me specific mental abilities exercised in acts of judgment, and expressed in the intelligent use of words (though not exclusively in such use). There is no reason to ascribe concepts (in this sense) to brutes.” (Peter T Geach, “Mental Acts: Their Content and their Objects”, 1954)

"The important point for us to observe is that all these constructions and the laws connecting them can be arrived at by the principle of looking for the mathematically simplest concepts and the link between them. In the limited number of mathematically existent simple field types, and the simple equations possible between them, lies the theorist’s hope of grasping the real in all its depth." (Albert Einstein, "Ideas and Opinions", 1954)

"What distinguishes the language of science from language as we ordinarily understand the word? […] What science strives for is an utmost acuteness and clarity of concepts as regards their mutual relation and their correspondence to sensory data." (Albert Einstein, "Ideas and Opinions", 1954)

"Science is the creation of concepts and their exploration in the facts. It has no other test of the concept than its empirical truth to fact." (Jacob Bronowski, "Science and Human Values", 1956)

"The progress of science has always been the result of a close interplay between our concepts of the universe and our observations on nature. The former can only evolve out of the latter and yet the latter is also conditioned greatly by the former. Thus in our exploration of nature, the interplay between our concepts and our observations may sometimes lead to totally unexpected aspects among already familiar phenomena." (Tsung-Dao Lee, "Weak Interactions and Nonconservation of Parity", [Nobel lecture] 1957)

"The reason why new concepts in any branch of science are hard to grasp is always the same; contemporary scientists try to picture the new concept in terms of ideas which existed before." (Freeman Dyson, "Innovation in Physics", Scientific American, 1958)

"[…] any serious examination of the basic concepts of any science is far more difficult than the elaboration of their ultimate consequences." (George F J Temple, "Turning Points in Physics", 1959)

"In general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is synonymous with the corresponding set of operations." (Percy W. Bridgman, "The Logic of Modern Physics", 1960)

"Awareness of universals is called conceiving, and a universal of which we are aware is called a concept." (Bertrand Russell, "Basic writings", 1961)

"For Science in its totality, the ultimate goal is the creation of a monistic system in which - on the symbolic level and in terms of the inferred components of invisibility and intangibly fine structure — the world’s enormous multiplicity is reduced to something like unity, and the endless successions of unique events of a great many different kinds get tidied and simplified into a single rational order. Whether this goal will ever be reached remains to be seen. Meanwhile we have the various sciences, each with its own system coordinating concepts, its own criterion of explanation." (Aldous Huxley, "Literature and Science", 1963)

"The view is often defended that sciences should be built up on clear and sharply defined basal concepts. In actual fact no science, not even the most exact, begins with such definitions. The true beginning of scientific activity consists rather in describing phenomena and then in proceeding to group, classify and correlate them." (Sigmund Freud, "General Psychological Theory", 1963)

"For a physicist mathematics is not just a tool by means of which phenomena can be calculated, it is the main source of concepts and principles by means of which new theories can be created." (Freeman Dyson, "Mathematics in the Physical Sciences", Scientific American, 1964)

"This language controls by reducing the linguistic forms and symbols of reflection, abstraction, development, contradiction; by substituting images for concepts. It denies or absorbs the transcendent vocabulary; it does not search for but establishes and imposes truth and falsehood." (Herbert Marcuse, "One-Dimensional Man", 1964)

"Every rule has its limits, and every concept its ambiguities. Most of all is this true in the science of life, where nothing quite corresponds to our ideas; similar ends are reached by varied means, and no causes are simple." (Lancelot L Whyte, "Internal Factors in Evolution", 1965)

"[…] the link between observation and formulation is one of the most difficult and crucial in the scientific enterprise. It is the process of interpreting our theory or, as some say, of ‘operationalizing our concepts’. Our creations in the world of possibility must be fitted in the world of probability; in Kant’s epigram, ‘Concepts without precepts are empty’. It is also the process of relating our observations to theory; to finish the epigram, ‘Precepts without concepts are blind’." (Scott Greer, "The Logic of Social Inquiry", 1969)

"Every word or concept, clear as it may seem to be, has only a limited range of applicability." (Werner Heisenberg, "Physics and Beyond", 1971)

"Concepts form the basis for any science. These are ideas, usually somewhat vague (especially when first encountered), which often defy really adequate definition. The meaning of a new concept can seldom be grasped from reading a one-paragraph discussion. There must be time to become accustomed to the concept, to investigate it with prior knowledge, and to associate it with personal experience. Inability to work with details of a new subject can often be traced to inadequate understanding of its basic concepts." (William C Reynolds & Harry C Perkins, "Engineering Thermodynamics", 1977)

"A schema, then is a data structure for representing the generic concepts stored in memory. There are schemata representing our knowledge about all concepts; those underlying objects, situations, events, sequences of events, actions and sequences of actions. A schema contains, as part of its specification, the network of interrelations that is believed to normally hold among the constituents of the concept in question. A schema theory embodies a prototype theory of meaning. That is, inasmuch as a schema underlying a concept stored in memory corresponds to the meaning of that concept, meanings are encoded in terms of the typical or normal situations or events that instantiate that concept." (David E Rumelhart, "Schemata: The building blocks of cognition", 1980)

“Concepts are inventions of the human mind used to construct a model of the world. They package reality into discrete units for further processing, they support powerful mechanisms for doing logic, and they are indispensable for precise, extended chains of reasoning.” (John Sown, “Conceptual Structures - Information Processing in Mind and Machine, 1984)

"The basic idea is that schemata are data structures for representing the generic concepts stored in memory. There are schemata for generalized concepts underlying objects, situations, events, sequences of events, actions, and sequences of actions. Roughly, schemata are like models of the outside world. To process information with the use of a schema is to determine which model best fits the incoming information. Ultimately, consistent configurations of schemata are discovered which, in concert, offer the best account for the input. This configuration of schemata together constitutes the interpretation of the input. (David E Rumelhart, Paul Smolensky, James L McClelland & Geoffrey E Hinton, "Schemata and sequential thought processes in PDP models", 1986)

"Science develops best when its concepts and conclusions are integrated into the broader human culture and its concerns for ultimate meaning and value." (Pope John Paul II, [letter to Father George V Coyne], 1988)

"From time immemorial, man has desired to comprehend the complexity of nature in terms of as few elementary concepts as possible." (Abdus Salam, "Ideals and Realities", 1989)

"The concepts of science, in all their richness and ambiguity, can be presented without any compromise, without any simplification counting as distortion, in language accessible to all intelligent people." (Stephen J Gould, "Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History", 1990)

"From a very early age, we form concepts. Each concept is a particular idea or understanding we have about our world. These concepts allow us to make sense of and reason about the things in our world. These things to which our concepts apply are called objects." (James Martin, 1993)

"For strictly scientific or technological purposes all this is irrelevant. On a pragmatic view, as on a religious view, theory and concepts are held in faith. On the pragmatic view the only thing that matters is that the theory is efficacious, that it ‘works’ and that the necessary preliminaries and side issues do not cost too much in time and effort. Beyond that, theory and concepts go to constitute a language in which the scientistic matters at issue can be formulated and discussed." (Bertram N Brockhouse, [lecture] 1994)

"A mental model is not normally based on formal definitions but rather on concrete properties that have been drawn from life experience. Mental models are typically analogs, and they comprise specific contents, but this does not necessarily restrict their power to deal with abstract concepts, as we will see. The important thing about mental models, especially in the context of mathematics, is the relations they represent. […]  The essence of understanding a concept is to have a mental representation or mental model that faithfully reflects the structure of that concept. (Lyn D English & Graeme S Halford, "Mathematics Education: Models and Processes", 1995)

"In the new systems thinking, the metaphor of knowledge as a building is being replaced by that of the network. As we perceive reality as a network of relationships, our descriptions, too, form an interconnected network of concepts and models in which there are no foundations. For most scientists such a view of knowledge as a network with no firm foundations is extremely unsettling, and today it is by no means generally accepted. But as the network approach expands throughout the scientific community, the idea of knowledge as a network will undoubtedly find increasing acceptance." (Fritjof Capra," The Web of Life: a new scientific understanding of living systems", 1996)

"An individual understands a concept, skill, theory, or domain of knowledge to the extent that he or she can apply it appropriately in a new situation." (Howard Gardner, "The Disciplined Mind", 1999)

"On their way toward modern science human beings have discarded meaning. The concept is replaced by the formula, the cause by rules and probability." (Theodor W Adorno, "Dialectic of Enlightenment", 2002)

"A concept is a brick. It can be used to build a courthouse of reason. Or it can be thrown through the window." (Gilles Deleuze, "EPZ Thousand Plateaus", 2004)

"At every major step physics has required, and frequently stimulated, the introduction of new mathematical tools and concepts. Our present understanding of the laws of physics, with their extreme precision and universality, is only possible in mathematical terms." (Michael F Atiyah, 2005)

"When the words are used without mental image or concrete objects, we label them as metaphor. […] While concepts are being internalised, language is not only appropriated but metaphorised." (Lynne Cameron, "Metaphor in the construction of a learning environment", 2008)

"The presentation of mathematics where you start with definitions, for example, is simply wrong. Definitions aren't the places where things start. Mathematics starts with ideas and general concepts, and then definitions are isolated from concepts. Definitions occur somewhere in the middle of a progression or the development of a mathematical concept. The same thing applies to theorems and other icons of mathematical progress. They occur in the middle of a progression of how we explore the unknown." (Michael P Starbird, [interview] 2009)

"A mathematical entity is a concept, a shared thought. Once you have acquired it, you have it available, for inspection or manipulation. If you understand it correctly (as a student, or as a professional) your ‘mental model’ of that entity, your personal representative of it, matches those of others who understand it correctly. (As is verified by giving the same answers to test questions.) The concept, the cultural entity, is nothing other than the collection of the mutually congruent personal representatives, the ‘mental models’, possessed by those participating in the mathematical culture." (Reuben Hersh, "Experiencing Mathematics: What Do We Do, when We Do Mathematics?", 2014)